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THE NINTH AMENDMENT: IT MEANS WHAT IT SAYS
Randy E. Barnett*
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.
—U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMEND. IX
ABSTRACT: Although the Ninth Amendment appears on its face to protect
unenumerated individual rights of the same sort as those that were enumerated in the
Bill of Rights, courts and scholars have long deprived it of any relevance to
constitutional adjudication.   With the growing interest in originalist methods of
interpretation since the 1980s, however, this situation has changed.  In the past
twenty years, five originalist models of the Ninth Amendment have been propounded
by scholars: The state law rights model, the residual rights model, the individual
natural rights model, the collective rights model, and the federalism model.  This
article examines thirteen crucial pieces of historical evidence that either directly
contradict the state law and residual rights models, undercut the collective rights
model, or strongly support the individual natural rights and federalism models.
Evaluating the five models in light of this evidence establishes that the Ninth
Amendment actually meant at the time of its enactment what it appears now to say:
the unenumerated  rights that people possessed prior to the formation of government
and which they retain should be accorded the same protection as those natural rights
that ended up being included in the enumeration.
INTRODUCTION
The first time one reads the Ninth Amendment, its text is a revelation.  Here
is a sentence that seems explicitly to affirm that persons have other constitutional
rights beyond those enumerated in the first eight amendments.  Given the fierce
debates over the legitimacy of enforcing unenumerated constitutional rights, one
immediately wonders why one has not heard of the Ninth before.  If this first
encounter is as a law student in a course on constitutional law, however, one soon
1United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947).
learns why: the Supreme Court has long dismissed the Ninth Amendment as a
constitutional irrelevance.  As Justice Reed wrote in 1947:
The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government are subtracted
from the totality of sovereignty originally in the states and the people. Therefore,
when objection is made that the exercise of a federal power infringes upon rights
reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward
the granted power under which the action of the Union was taken. If granted power
is found, necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, must fail.1
Not only does Justice Reed’s construction render the Ninth Amendment functionless
in constitutional adjudication, it rather carelessly runs it together with the Tenth
Amendment.  
But this passage is not only cavalier about the text, it is historically incorrect.
The evidence of original meaning that has been uncovered in the past twenty years
confirms the first impression of untutored readers of the Ninth Amendment, and
undercuts the purportedly more sophisticated reading that renders it meaningless.
The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to ensure that all individual natural rights
had the same stature and force after some of them were enumerated as they had
before, and argues against a latitudinarian interpretation of federal powers. 
The growth in our understanding of the Ninth Amendment has resulted from
the interest in the original meaning of the Constitution that began in the 1980s.  As
originalism grew in popularity, some originalists became understandably curious
about the history and original meaning of the Ninth Amendment.  And critics of
originalism used the original meaning of Ninth Amendment to challenge those early
originalists who were then advocating a narrow view of constitutional rights.  As a
result, after having been largely forgotten by academics, over the past twenty years
this enigmatic provision has received an outpouring of serious scholarly attention. 
In this article, I synthesize the developing modern scholarly debate about the
original meaning of the Ninth Amendment and demonstrate that the cumulative
evidence of public original meaning supports a view of the amendment as a
meaningful check on federal power and a significant guarantee of individual liberty.
The synthesis begins with the mapping of the intellectual terrain.  Even most
constitutional scholars do not realize that five distinct originalist models of the Ninth
Amendment have emerged since 1983:  (1) The state-law rights model, (2) the
residual rights model, (3) the individual natural rights model, (4) the collective rights
model and (5) the federalism model.  
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The first two of these models—the state law and residual rights—lead to the
conclusion that the Ninth Amendment is a constitutional truism with no practical
significance in constitutional adjudication.  In the collective rights model, if not
combined with another, the Amendment has a very limited scope.  The individual
natural rights and federalism models—both of which I have long advocated—accord
to the Ninth Amendment a significant role in constitutional interpretation, operating
to preserve unenumerated individual rights and to negate latitudinarian constructions
of Congress’s enumerated powers.  The last three of these models are not mutually
exclusive.  Although the evidence supporting the collective rights model is thin, were
this model to be established, it could be used to supplement rather than supplant the
individual natural rights and federalism models.
The fact that there have been five distinct models of the Ninth Amendment
in no way supports a claim that originalism generally, or the original meaning of the
Ninth Amendment in particular, is indeterminate.  To the contrary, as this body of
scholarship developed—often through sharp debate—it produced an increasingly
closer, careful and comprehensive examination of the relevant sources.  The more we
investigated, the more we learned, and we now know much more about the
Amendment’s original meaning than we used to.  And what we know is both
internally consistent and generally persuasive. 
Progress in originalism is not only possible; it has occurred.  Because
originalism is driven by the evidence, progress is made as the evidence accumulates,
disconfirming some models and providing support for others.  Although the final
word on the Ninth Amendment is yet to be written, a compelling pattern has begun
to emerge.  In this article, I describe this emerging pattern and show how the
cumulative effect of the available historical evidence suggests strong support for the
individual rights and federalism models.
This is not to imply that the original meaning of this or any provision tells us
all we need to know to apply it to current cases and controversies.  For those
nonoriginalists for whom original meaning provides a starting point, or “modality”
of constitution interpretation, it nevertheless remains important to get that original
meaning correct, before moving on to other modalities or to “translate” original
meaning into today’s application.  Even for a committed originalist, original meaning
often requires the determination of specific doctrines or rules of law to put that
meaning into effect; and these “constitutional constructions” are not reducible to the
original meaning of the text itself.  Instead, competing constructions must be assessed
to see if they are consistent with this original meaning, though not logicallydeducible
from it. 
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The meat of this article will be comparing and contrasting the arguments of
particular scholars who have written extensively on the Ninth
Amendment—especially arguments by Russell Caplan, Thomas McAffee, Akhil
Amar and most recently by Kurt Lash.  While I strongly disagree with the
conclusions of Caplan and McAffee, it is worth noting that Professor Lash and I end
up in a nearly identical place: the Ninth Amendment justifies a narrow or “strict”
construction of federal powers, and especially implied federal powers.  On both of
our accounts, the Ninth Amendment argues against what Madison called a
“latitudinarian” interpretation of the enumerated powers—including the Necessary
and Proper Clause.  While Professor Lash also defends the collective rights model,
he does not deny that the Ninth Amendment refers, at least in part, to individual
natural rights.2  So readers should not take away from our disagreement about
particular items of evidence any inference that some great difference turns on the
outcome of our dispute.  Professor Lash’s and my approaches largely overlap and,
where they differ, are not necessarily mutually inconsistent.
In Part I of this article, I begin by identifying the version of originalism I will
be employing: original public meaning originalism.  Part II consists of a very brief
description of the origins of the Ninth Amendment.  This legislative history is
entirely noncontroversial and all five competing models rely upon it.  In Part III, I
neutrally describe each model using the label employed by its proponents.  In this
Part, I also offer some preliminary critical comments on the plausibility of the state
law rights, residual rights, and collective rights models.  
Part IV is the heart of the analysis.  Whereas each of these models is
consistent with much of the evidence of original meaning, I present in this Part a
series of key pieces of originalist evidence that are inconsistent with some of these
models and strongly supportive of others.  On the basis of this evidence, the state law
rights and residual rights models can be eliminated from consideration as best
describing the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment, while the plausibility of
collective rights model is undermined.  
In contrast, all of this evidence either supports or is not inconsistent with the
individual natural rights and federalist models.  In the end, we shall see that the way
a member of the public would read the Ninth Amendment today—before being
exposed to a more “sophisticated” interpretation—was also its original meaning at
the time of its enactment.  Given that the English language has not changed so much
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in two hundred years, that the Ninth Amendment actually meant then what it now
appears to say should not come as a surprise.
I. ORIGINALIST METHODOLOGY
The methodology employed in this Article is originalist, but that label is
ambiguous because there are at least three distinctive originalist approaches.
Original framers intent, original ratifiers understanding, and original public meaning.
Original framers intent focuses on the intentions of those who wrote the Constitution.
Original ratifiers understanding looks for the intentions and expectations of those
who voted to ratify the text.  Original public meaning looks to how a reasonable
member of the public (including but not limited to the framers and ratifiers) would
have understood the words of the text (in context) at the time of its enactment.  The
form of originalism I will employ is based on the original public meaning of the text.
I will not recapitulate here the strengths and weaknesses of each of these
approaches, as I have done so elsewhere.3  Original framers intent was the version of
originalism first advocated by AttorneyGeneral Edwin Meese in the 1980s in a series
of influential lectures that sparked a voluminous academic critique.  Though for a
time some originalists shifted to original ratifiers understanding, most originalists
have come to adopt original public meaning, which is now the dominant mode of
originalist scholarship.
This evolution in originalist methodology is worth mentioning because the
timing of academic interest in the Ninth Amendment corresponds to the introduction
of original framers intent originalism in the 1980s.  As a result, we may see early
Ninth Amendment scholarship focusing on framers intent to a degree one would not
witness today.  Having said this, these different originalist methods are not always
easy to distinguish in practice.  Evidence of framers intent or ratifiers understanding
is also typically good evidence of original public meaning.  Still, it does happen that
particular items of evidence assume a greater or lesser importance depending upon
which version of originalism is being employed.  
A good example of this is Roger Sherman’s draft of a bill of rights that will
be discuss in Part IV.   Notwithstanding evidence that Sherman himself opposed the
provisions therein, his use of language in this draft is highly pertinent to the original
meaning of the words that are also used in the Ninth Amendment.  The bearing of
this document on the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment has nothing
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whatsoever to do with the intentions of Roger Sherman—apart from his intention to
use the English language in a manner that would be understood by his audience.  The
same can be said of evidence of word usage by participants at the Constitutional
Convention and in private correspondence.  It is no accident that these discussions
about the language used in the text would be pertinent to ascertaining its meaning,
wholly apart from the intentions or expectations of those who used these words to
communicate their thoughts to others.
Unfortunately, the debate over the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment
cannot be settled with the same sort of quantitative evidence that can be used to
interpret, for example, key portions of the Commerce Clause.4  Unlike the word
“commerce” which can be shown to have a discernable meaning distinct from such
other economic activities as agriculture and manufacturing, the phrase “other rights
retained by the people” cannot be established by a systematic study of general usage.
Instead, to establish its public meaning, it becomes necessary to examine the
publicly-known purpose for which this amendment was added.  This is not to revert
to an original framers intent approach, however.  We consult the publicly-known
purpose for which the Ninth Amendment was conceived, because the public
understanding of its text was shaped by this purpose. 
Because the words of the Ninth Amendment could have been used in different
ways at the time of its enactment depending on the context, the Ninth Amendment
is open to more possible interpretations than other provisions of the text.  The
challenge is  to identify a conceptual model that best fits the available evidence.  The
term “model” seems apt because an originalist inquiry is empirical in nature.  To the
extent that these models are mutually exclusive—as the last three models are from
the first two, and the first two from each other—the challenge is to choose the model
(or compatible models) that best fits the available evidence of original public
meaning.  Before describing the models and presenting the key evidence, however,
I will briefly summarize the legislative history of the Ninth Amendment for those
who are not familiar with how this pregnant passage came to be included in the text.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
During the ratification debates over the Constitution, the principal objection
made by its opponents that resonated with the public was the absence of a bill of
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rights.  In response to this objection, supporters of the Constitution offered two
arguments.  The first was that a bill of rights was unnecessary.  Because the
Constitution was one of limited and enumerated powers, these enumerated limits
constituted a bill of rights.5 Secondly, they argued that a bill of rights would be
dangerous.  By attempting to enumerate any rights to be protected, it would imply
that all that were not listed were surrendered.  And it would be impossible to
enumerate all the rights of the people.6
Critics of the Constitution—labeled by its supporters as
“Antifederalists”—offered two telling rejoinders to these arguments.  As to the lack
of necessity, they questioned the effectiveness of enumerated powers as a limitation
of federal powers, especially in light of the existence of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, which was then known as the Sweeping Clause.  As to the issue of
dangerousness, they pointed to the rights already protected in Article I, sec. 9, such
as the guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus.  If enumerating any rights was
dangerous, then this very short list invited the same danger, which would only be
ameliorated, however imperfectly, by expanding the list of protected rights.
Opponents of the Constitution, it should be noted, were more interested in
advancing an argument that would defeat ratification than in actually obtaining a bill
of rights.  Their insistence on a bill of rights was offered with the objective of
recommitting the constitution to a convention for further consideration, during which
time it could effectively be killed.  For this reason, supporters of the Constitution
countered the popular demand for a bill of rights with a pledge to offer amendments
to the Constitution after its ratification.  This pledge won the day for the Constitution
by tipping the political balance sufficiently to obtain ratification.  Several ratification
conventions thereafter accompanied their ratification with list of proposed
amendments or changes to the Constitution along with proposals for a bill of rights.
In the first Congress, it fell to Virginia Representative James Madison to
insist, over both indifference and vocal opposition, that the House take up the issue
of amendments.  In a now famous and much-analyzed speech, he introduced a list of
amendments that he proposed be inserted within the text of the Constitution.  At the
end of the list of rights to be added to Article I, section 9 (where the individual right
of habeas corpus was located) was the following precursor of what eventually
became the Ninth Amendment:
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The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights
retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.7
By contrast, Madison proposed that the provision that eventually became the Tenth
Amendment be inserted after Article VI as a new Article VII.  
In his speech Madison explained this proposed precursor of the Ninth
Amendment in terms that connects it directly with Federalist objections to the Bill
of Rights:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow, by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure.  This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights
into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.  I have attempted
it, as gentleman may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.8
All of Madison’s proposals were then committed for consideration to a Select
Committee of which he was a member, along with other members such as
Connecticut Representative Roger Sherman.  What emerged from that committee
was a list of amendments to be appended to the end of the Constitution, rather than
integrated within the text so as literally to amend or change it.  The eleventh of this
list was the amendment that we know as the Ninth Amendment.  The numbering
changed when the first two proposed amendments failed of ratification, though the
one covering Congressional pay increases was eventually ratified in 1992 becoming
the 27th Amendment.  
After a period of time, the numbers used to refer to the amendments was
altered to reflect the absence of the first two proposals but, for a time, the Ninth
Amendment was called the Eleventh Amendment.  This change in numbering
initially inhibited a proper understanding of the Ninth Amendment by concealing an
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important use of the Ninth Amendment in a constitutional argument by none other
than then-Representative James Madison.  Ever since the rediscovery of Madison’s
use of the Ninth Amendment, the debate has moved towards substantial convergence,
as we shall see.
III. FIVE ORIGINALIST MODELS OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The modern debate over the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment was
triggered by the testimony of Judge Robert Bork during the hearings over his
Supreme Court nomination.  After extensive grilling in which he was asked to
reconcile his originalism with the text of the Ninth Amendment, he offered the
following analogy: 
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know something of
what it means.  For example, if you had an amendment that says, “Congress shall
make no” and then there is an inkblot, and you cannot read the rest of it, and that
is the only copy you have, I do not think the court can make up what might be under
the inkblot.9
Coming from someone committed to originalism, this statement was controversial
to say the least.  Within months an extensive literature on the Ninth Amendment
began to accumulate.10
As interesting as his Senate testimony, was how Judge Bork treated the Ninth
Amendment in his later book, The Tempting of America.  There, he switched his
inkblot metaphor to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.11  As his interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, he offered instead the
theory proposed by Russell Caplan in his 1983 Virginia Law Review article, The
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History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment.12  In this manner, Caplan’s thesis was
elevated to become the first of five distinct models of the Ninth Amendment
considered by those seeking its original meaning.  So it is to his approach that I first
turn.
A.  The State-Law Rights Model
Russell Caplan’s article may have been the first article on the original
meaning of the Ninth Amendment to gain a wide audience.  As such, it received
considerable attention and it is unsurprising that his approach would have been
adopted by Robert Bork.  Caplan’s thesis was that the “other rights” to which the
Ninth Amendment refers were state constitutional and common law rights.  The
effect of the Ninth Amendment, he contended, was to prevent any suggestion that the
adoption of the Constitution displaced or supplanted these rights.  Here is how he
stated his thesis:
[T]he ninth amendment is not a cornucopia of undefined federal rights, but rather
is limited to a specific function, well-understood at the time of its adoption: the
maintenance of rights guaranteed by the law of the states.  These state rights
represented entitlements derived from both natural law theory and the hereditary
rights of Englishmen, but ninth amendment protection did not transform these rights
into constitutional, that is, federal rights. . . . [The amendment] simply provides that
the individual rights contained in state law are to continue in force under the
Constitution until modified or eliminated by state enactment, by federal preemption,
or by a judicial determination of unconstitutionality.13
According to Caplan, states were free to change their own constitutional or common
law rights without violating the Ninth Amendment and, under the Supremacy Clause,
national legislation that affected these state law rights, but which was within the
powers of the federal government, would also not violate the Ninth Amendment. 
Under Caplan’s reading, then, the Ninth Amendment had no practical
application in constitutional adjudication.  Apart from its conflict with crucial pieces
of evidence as we shall see in Part IV, Caplan’s thesis also suffers from his inability
to produce any contemporary statement that clearly interprets the Ninth Amendment
the way he does.  His evidence is entirely circumstantial.
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B.  The Residual Rights Model
In 1990, Thomas McAffee put forth what he called the “residual rights”
conception of the Ninth Amendment in his article, The Original Meaning of the
Ninth Amendment.14  According to McAffee, the Ninth Amendment was originally
intended solely to prevent later interpreters of the Constitution from exploiting the
incompleteness of the enumeration of rights to expand federal powers beyond those
delegated by the Constitution.  “On the residual rights reading, the ninth amendment
serves the unique function of safeguarding the system of enumerated powers against
a particular threat arguably presented by the enumeration of limitations on national
power.”15   So, for example: 
If the government contended in a particular case that it held a general power to
regulate the press as an appropriate inference from the first amendment restriction
on that power, or argued that it possessed a general police power by virtue of the
existence of the bill of rights, the ninth amendment would provide a direct
refutation.16
In sum, according to McAffee, the exclusive function of the Ninth Amendment is to
protect the scheme of delegate powers by arguing against this specific sort of
inference.  As he puts it:
The Ninth Amendment reads entirely as a “hold harmless” provision: it thus says
nothing about how to construe the powers of Congress or how broadly to read the
doctrine of implied powers; it indicates only that no inference about those powers
should be drawn from the mere fact that rights are enumerated in the Bill of
Rights.17
McAffee denied that what he dubbed the “residual rights” retained by the
people “are to be defined independently of, and may serve to limit the scope of,
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powers granted to the national government by the Constitution.”18  Instead, he
maintained that “the other rights retained by the people are defined residually from
the powers granted to the national government.”19
Both Russell Caplan and Thomas McAffee viewed the Ninth Amendment as
having the sole purpose of responding to a single potential misconstruction of the
Constitution (though they differ on the particular misconstruction to which the Ninth
Amendment is responding). According to Caplan, the only purpose of the Ninth
Amendment is to respond to the argument, should it ever be made, that the
Constitution has supplanted state law rights.  According to McAffee, the only
purpose of the Ninth Amendment is to respond to the argument, should it ever be
made, that the enumeration of particular rights in the Constitution implies that
Congress has broader powers.  
As we shall see in Part IV, the most telling evidence against both these
positions is that James Madison used the Ninth Amendment in a constitutional
debate, while it was still pending ratification in the states, outside the only contexts
that Caplan and McAffee claimed it was supposed to be used.  In his speech to the
House about the national bank, Madison cited the Ninth Amendment, though there
was no issue of supplanting state law rights (as distinct from state powers which were
at issue) nor any claim that the Congress had the power to enact a bank because of
the enumeration of rights in the Constitution.
C.  The Individual Natural Rights Model
In prior work, I have defended the view that the “other rights” protected by
the Ninth Amendment are individual natural rights.  The purpose of the Ninth
Amendment was to ensure that these rights had the same stature and force after
enumeration as they had before.  Specifically, in the two year interregnum  before the
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, Congress would have acted
improperly and unconstitutionally had it infringed the natural rights to the freedom
of speech, to the free exercise of religion, and to keep and bear arms.  It would have
also acted unconstitutionally had it taken private property for public use without just
compensation.  All these individual natural rights existed prior to the Bill of Rights
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and were added to the Constitution, in Madison’s words, “for greater caution.”20  In
contrast, other positive rights, such as the right of trial by jury in the Fifth
Amendment,  were not constitutional rights before their enactment.  These rights
were, again in Madison’s words, “actual limitations”21 on delegated federal power
that did not pre-exist the enactment of the Bill of Rights.  
According to the individual natural rights model, the Ninth Amendment was
meant to preserve the “other” individual natural rights that were “retained by the
people” when forming a government but which were not included in “the
enumeration of certain rights.”  These other rights retained by the people are as
enforceable after the enactment of the Bill of Rights as the retained rights of freedom
of speech, press, assembly, and free exercise of religion were enforceable before the
enactment of the Bill of Rights.  In other words, the purpose of the Ninth
Amendment was to ensure the equal protection of unenumerated individual natural
rights on a par with those individual natural rights that came to be listed “for greater
caution” in the Bill of Rights.  
On this reading, the Ninth Amendment has the important function of negating
any construction of the Constitution that would protect only enumerated rights, and
leave unenumerated rights unprotected.  In this manner, the Ninth Amendment
specifically negates the judicial philosophy adopted in the first paragraph of the
famous Footnote Four of U.S. v. Carolene Products, that asserts that “[t]here may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionalitywhen legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments. . . .22
It would be mistaken in several ways to characterize the individual natural
rights model as  claiming that the Ninth Amendment is a “source” of independent
rights—or, as Russell Caplan put it, “a cornucopia of undefined federal
rights”23—that are immune from any government regulation.  First, natural rights
precede the Constitution, and the Ninth Amendment is not their “source.”  Instead,
according to this model, the Ninth Amendment refers to these pre-existing rights and
requires that all natural rights be protected equally—not be “disparaged”—whether
or not they are enumerated.  
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Second, this model does not view constitutional rights as necessarily
trumping all laws that may affect their exercise.  This model does not exclude the
regulation of natural rights, any more than an individual natural rights model of the
First Amendment excludes all time, place or manner regulations of speech, press, or
assembly.  A proper regulation is not a prohibition, but instead proscribes the manner
by which a particular liberty is to be exercised to protect the rights of others.  The
individual natural rights model would justify the scrutiny of regulations of liberty to
ensure that they are reasonable and necessary, rather than an improper attempt by
government to restrict their exercise.  
In addition, an individual natural rights model would provide no barrier to
prohibiting (as opposed to regulating) wrongful behavior that violates the rights of
others.  Under this approach, while rightful exercises of liberty may only be regulated
(not prohibited), wrongful acts that violate the equal rights of others are not exercises
of liberty and may be prohibited, not just regulated.  What adhering to this model
would bar is the prohibition—as opposed to the regulation—of rightful exercises of
natural rights.
Third, the individual natural rights model does not entail that judges identify
particular natural rights and then protect them.  Instead, the courts could put the
burden of justification on the federal government whenever legislation restricts the
exercise of liberty.  As I have explained,24 this presumption may be rebutted by a
showing that a particular law was a necessary regulation of rightful or a prohibition
of a wrongful act.25  What is barred by the Ninth Amendment under this model is the
prohibition or unnecessary regulation of rightful acts.  According to a Presumption
of Liberty, the unenumerated liberties retained by the people would receive the same
presumptive protection as that now accorded some of the enumerated rights.
Lastly, it would be mistaken to characterize the individual natural rights
model as entailing federal restrictions on the powers of states.  The Ninth
Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, originally applied only to the federal
government.26  True, natural rights could also limit the just powers of state
governments, but this would be because of their independent force rather than the
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collective political rights that Akhil Amar has in mind—such as the right of revolution—pre-exist the
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salutary affect of showing the potential compatibility of the individual natural rights model with the
collective rights model.  However, to avoid confusion, as well as the risk of misrepresentation, I have
retained the term favored by Amar (and by Kurt Lash).
textual existence of the Ninth Amendment, which would not by itself justify federal
protection against the violation of natural rights of individuals by their state
governments.  It was only with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment—in
particular the Privileges or Immunities Clause—that the federal government obtained
any jurisdiction to protect the unenumerated retained natural rights of the people
from infringement by state governments.
In sum, the individual natural rights model can be viewed as justifying a rule
of construction by which claims of federal power can be adjudicated, rather than as
an independent source of rights that automatically trumps any exercise of
governmental power.  This model does not require that specific natural rights be
identified, but can work in the same presumptive way that now protects the natural
rights of speech, press, and assembly.  And this model does not purport to limit state
power.
D.  The Collective Rights Model
According to the collective rights model, the “other” rights retained by the
people is a reference to the rights that the people possess as a collective political
body, as distinct from the rights they possess as individuals.27  Although, so far as I
am aware, no Ninth Amendment scholar has claimed this to have been the exclusive
meaning of the Ninth Amendment, I identify it as a separate model because at least
two Ninth Amendment scholars—Akhil Amar and Kurt Lash—have claimed that the
purpose of Ninth Amendment was, at least in part and perhaps even primarily, the
protection of the retained rights of the people viewed collectively, as distinct from
the rights of particular individuals.  Akhil Amar comes very close to claiming an
exclusively collective rights reading of the Ninth Amendment, without crossing the
line completely:
The conspicuously collective meaning of “the people” in the Tenth Amendment
(and elsewhere) should alert us that its core meaning in the Ninth is similarly
collective.  Indeed, the most obvious and inalienable right underlying the Ninth
Amendment is the collective right of We the People to alter or abolish government,
through the distinctly American device of the constitutional convention. . . .  To see
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the Ninth Amendment, as originally written, as a palladium of countermajoritarian
individual rights—like privacy—is to engage in anachronism.28
If taken as the exclusive reading of the Ninth Amendment, the collective natural
rights model would be inconsistent with the individual natural rights model.  But the
two are not mutually exclusive.   It is possible that the “other” rights retained by the
people were both individual and collective, in which case the collective rights model
identifies a potential application of the Ninth Amendment beyond the protection of
individual liberties.
Whatever the merits of the collective rights model of the Bill of Rights in
general, there is reason to be skeptical of it as a model of the Ninth Amendment in
particular.  As was seen above, Antifederalist opponents of the Constitution objected
to its lack of a bill of rights, though they were more concerned with defeating the
Constitution than obtaining such a bill.  Many of the rights that were eventually
included were drawn from recommendations of state ratification conventions, and
can be viewed as “Antifederalist” in their nature.  By this I mean, these proposals
were proposed by and adopted to placate Antifederalist opponents of the Constitution
who opposed its ratification.  The original public meaning of these amendments
reflects, therefore, their Antifederalist source and audience.  As Madison explained
in his Amendments Speech to the House:
It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this house, that, notwithstanding the
ratification of this system of government by eleven of the thirteen United States, in
some cases unanimously, in others by large majorities; yet still there is a great
number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it; among whom are many
respectable for their talents, their patriotism, and respectable for the jealousy they
have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object, is laudable in its motive.
There is a great body of the people falling under this description, who as present
feel much inclined to join their support to the cause of federalism, if they were
satisfied in this one point: We ought not to disregard their inclination, but, on
principles of amity and moderation, conform to their wishes, and expressly declare
the great rights of mankind secured under this constitution.29
Given the Antifederalist origins of the Bill of Rights—including the Tenth
Amendment, a form of which was proposed by every ratification convention that
forwarded amendments—it is tempting to interpret the Ninth Amendment as
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similarly Antifederalist. But the temptation should be resisted.  As we shall see,
Madison designed the Ninth Amendment by substantially altering state proposals to
address the concerns expressed during ratification by Federalist supporters of the
Constitution.  In particular, it was meant to address their concern that enumerating
some rights would be dangerous.  
In this regard, within the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment is sui generis.
While the rest of the Bill of Rights was a response to Antifederalist objections to the
Constitution, the Ninth Amendment was a response to Federalist objections to the
Bill of Rights.  It is very far from clear that the sorts of rights that Federalists feared
would be “surrendered up” to a general government were “collective” rather than
individual in nature.  Evidence of Antifederalist attachments to “collective rights” is
beside the point.  That Madison’s version of the Ninth Amendment was a departure
from, rather than an incorporation of, the public meaning of similarly-worded
Antifederalist-inspired state proposals will become apparent below.30
E.  The Federalism Model of the Ninth Amendment
Chronologically, the final model to emerge within the Ninth Amendment
literature of the past twenty years is the federalism model.  According to this model,
the Ninth Amendment justifies a narrow or strict construction of enumerated federal
powers, especially powers implied under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  I have
come to conclude that, unlike the first four models already discussed, this is not a
model of the original meaning of the text.  In other words, it does not even purport
to tell us what the text originally and literally said to a member of the general public
at the time it was enacted.  Instead, it is model of what is properly considered a
“constitutional construction” by which the meaning of what the text does say can be
put into effect.  For this reason, it should not be surprising that this model might well
be consistent with both the individual natural rights and collective rights models.  By
the same token, evidence that the Ninth Amendment was used to justify a narrow
construction of federal power is, as we shall see,  inconsistent with the state law
rights and residual rights models.
This federalism model of the Ninth Amendment was suggested by Akhil
Amar shortly after his claim that the “core meaning” of the Ninth Amendment is the
protection of collective rights:
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32See id. at 123 (“As Professor McAffee has shown, the amendment’s legislative history
strongly supports an enumerated-powers federalism-based reading.”).
33Id. at 124.
34Id.
The Ninth Amendment also sounds in part in federalism, but many constitutional
scholars today have missed the beat.  As with our First and Tenth Amendments, the
Ninth explicitly sought to protect liberty by preventing Congress from going beyond
its enumerated powers in Article I, section 8 and elsewhere in the Constitution. . .
.  To be sure, on a federalism-based reading, the Ninth and Tenth fit together
snugly, as their words and legislative history make clear; but each amendment
complements the other without duplicating it.  The Tenth says that Congress must
point to some explicit or implicit enumerated power before it can act; and the Ninth
addresses the closely related but distinct question of whether such express or
implied power in fact exists.31
Amar’s initial presentation of this model was fuzzy.  For one thing he
presented no originalist evidence of his own, relying solely on Thomas McAffee’s
historical analysis.32  His explanation of the “federalism” reading of the Ninth
Amendment sounds exactly like McAffee’s residual rights approach: 
In particular, the Ninth Amendment warns readers not to infer from the enumeration
of a right in the Bill of Rights that implicit federal power in fact exists in a given
domain.  This, for example, we must not infer from our First Amendment that
Congress was ever given legislative power in the first place to regulate religion in
the states, or to censor speech.33
He then immediately muddies the water still further by distinguishing the federalism
reading from the collective rights reading: “Of course, both the Ninth and Tenth go
beyond pure federalism in their ringing affirmations of popular sovereignty.”34
In short, even knowledgeable readers of Amar are likely to be confused into
thinking that the “federalism” reading of the Ninth Amendment is both reducible to
Thomas McAffee’s residual rights model and entirely distinct from Amar’s own
collective natural rights model.  If this is what Amar meant to claim, then this is not
the federalism model I am considering in this section.  But I think Amar may well
have been suggesting a distinctive federalism position that is not reducible to the
residual rights model and is potentially consistent with a concern for collective rights.
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The Ninth Amendment scholar who has done the most to clarify and support
this sort of distinctive federalism model is Kurt Lash.  A federalism model, as he
describes it, is one that justifies a strict or narrow construction of federal powers,
especially the claim of implied powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Lash
describes this approach as follows: “Although the Ninth and Tenth Amendments both
limited federal power, they did so in different ways.  The Tenth insured [sic] that the
federal government would exercise only those powers enumerated in the
Constitution.  The Ninth Amendment went further, however, and prohibited an
expanded interpretation of those powers.”35  Lash distinguishes his account from
McAffee’s byuse of the helpful distinction between “active” and passive” federalism
approaches:  
To date, federalist theories of the Ninth Amendment have been “passive” in that
they do not view the Ninth as justifying judicial intervention.  This approach reads
the Ninth as a mere declaration that the enumerated rights do not imply otherwise
unenumerated federal power.  In essence, a passive, federalist reading limits the
Ninth to preserving the principle declared in the Tenth Amendment—all powers not
delegated are reserved.36
He then accurately characterizes McAffee as “arguing that the Ninth Amendment is
not a limitation on federal power, but works in conjunction with the Tenth to
preserve the concept of enumerated powers.”37  In contrast, Lash allows that it “is
possible to take an active federalist approach to the Ninth Amendment.  This would
view the Ninth Amendment as a judicially enforceable rule of construction limiting
the power of the federal government to interfere with the retained liberty of the
people to local self-government.”38
Here and elsewhere in his two articles, Lash appears to suggest that the
“active” federalism approach is meant to protect only collective rights.  For example,
in the very next paragraph he says, “Just as the active Libertarian reading creates a
presumption in favor of unenumerated rights, so the active federalist reading creates
a presumption in favor of the collective right of the people to state or local self-
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39Id. at 346-47.  Notice how the “the collective right of the people to state or local self-
government” is an Antifederalist, rather than a Federalist, concern.  I am use the term “federalism”
rather than “federalist” to describe this model, because the restrictions on federal powers it
recommends serves Antifederalist as well as Federalist objectives.
40See Lash, supra note 2, at 362 (“One of the principle issues left open by the test of the Ninth
Amendment involves the ‘other rights’ protected by the Ninth’s rule of construction.  Federalist
theories emphasize the collective rights of the people of the several states - the right to local self-
government on all matters not assigned to the federal government.”); See Kurt Lash, The Lost
Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L.REV. 597, 609 (2005)(“The rarity and universal
rejection of attempts to read the Ninth Amendment as a source of libertarian rights tracks the original
understanding of the Ninth as a rule protecting the retained collective rights of the people of the
several states.”); Id. at 684 (“Hughes’s opinion in Ashwander presents one of the clearest examples
of Ninth Amendment rights being read to refer to the collective rights of local self-government.”). 
41Id at 399.
government.”39 Examples of this sort of “collective rights” rhetoric are numerous
throughout his two lengthy articles.40
Taken together with his stark distinction between what he calls the
“Libertarian reading” and his “federalist” reading, readers are likely to be misled into
thinking that an “active” federalism model is somehow incompatible with an active
individual natural rights model.  Yet elsewhere, when summing up his approach,
Lash describes the federalism model as embracing both individual and collective
natural rights: 
The text of the Ninth does not limit its application to natural rights.  All retained
rights, natural or otherwise, were protected from denial or disparagement as a result
of the decision to enumerate “certain rights.”  Neither the text nor the purpose of the
Ninth Amendment was limited to protecting a subcategory of retained rights.41
Certainly as a logical matter, an “active” federalism reading of the Ninth
Amendment that effectively limited the scope of Congressional powers would serve
to protect both the natural rights of individuals and any collective right of the people
to self-government (Lash) or to alter or abolish their government (Amar).  In this
sense the federalism model is consistent with both the individual and collective
natural rights models.  With the Ninth Amendment, as elsewhere in the Constitution,
federalism is a means rather than an end in itself.  And a principal end of federalism
is the protection of the liberties of the people, both personal and political.
Perhaps the biggest mistake of contending theorists of the Ninth Amendment
is to view their favored model as exclusive.  Once we distinguish means from ends,
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evidence supporting a federalism function of the Ninth Amendment can be viewed
as logicallyconsistent with both the individual and collective rights models.  Arguing
against a latitudinarian construction of express and implied federal powers is a
powerful means of protecting whatever rights were thought retained by the people,
whether individual, collective, or both. 
That the federalism model is logically compatible with both the individual
and collective natural rights models, however, does not entail that all three comprise
the actual original meaning of the Ninth Amendment.  That question must be settled
by evidence.  And, even if these three models can be rendered compatible with each
other, that does not entail that they are also compatible with the state law rights or
residual rights models.  Indeed, as will be shown in the next Part, important pieces
of evidence of original meaning are incompatible with either of these earlier
originalist models.
IV. KEY EVIDENCE OF ORIGINAL MEANING
Most originalist analyses of the Ninth Amendment consist of lengthy
renditions of the historical developments leading up to its adoption, the process of
its drafting and ratification, and constitutional commentary afterwards.  To this, Kurt
Lash has added an entire article on the use of the Ninth Amendment by various courts
and litigants after its enactment.42  These presentations are always impressive and
tend to be persuasive to those unfamiliar with the terrain.  
The difference in their conclusions largely results from differences in how
particular items of evidence are placed in a larger context.  Further, earlier work
failed to consider vital pieces of evidence that only gained wide attention as the
scholarly debate evolved.  Also, crucial moves are sometimes made without support,
though this is often hard to see given that these particular assertions are surrounded
by a dense thicket of evidence that does not directly establish the point at issue.
We have already seen one example of the last phenomenon in Akhil Amar’s
unsupported assertion (apart from his intratextual linkage to other amendments and
a single citation to Thomas McAffee) that “the most obvious and inalienable right
underlying the Ninth Amendment is the collective right of We the People to alter or
abolish government, through the distinctly American device of the constitutional
convention.”43   No direct or indirect evidence is provided here or elsewhere that this
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44Massachusetts Constitution 1780 (“Government is instituted for the common good; for the
protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people . . . therefore the people alone have an
incontestible, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally
change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it.” THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS 677 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter THE COMPLETEBILLOFRIGHTS]; Maryland’s Declaration of Right 1776
(“That all government of right originates from the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted
soley for the good of the whole.” Id. at 676); North Carolina’s Declaration of Right (“That all political
Power is vested in and derived from the People only.” Id. at 678); Pennsylvania Constitution (“the
people have a right, by common consent to change [the government], and take such measures as to
them may appear necessary to promote their safety and happiness.” Id.); Vermont Constitution (“the
People have a Right by common Consent to change [the government], and take such Measures as to
them may appear necessary to promote their Safety and Happiness.” Id.); Virginia’s Declaration of
Rights 1776 (“That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from the people; that Magistrates
are their trustees and servants, and at all times amendable to them.” Id.); South Carolina’s Constitution
1790 (“All power is originally vested in the people; and all free governments are founded on their
authority, and are instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness.” Id.); New Jersey Constitution 1776
(“[government] was by Compact, derived from the People, and held for them, for the common Interest
of the whole Society.” Id.).
45Id. at 635 (“That the Powers of Government may be reassumed by the People, whensoever
it shall become necessary to their Happiness.”)(NY July 26, 1788)  Even the proposals by minorities
in the state ratification conventions are devoid of references to this right.
is the right to which the Ninth Amendment specifically refers.  By the time they reach
page 120 of Amar’s otherwise well-researched book, however, readers are likely not
to notice that this particular claim lacks any evidentiary support.
On the other hand, it is not implausible to think that the right of the people
to alter or abolish their governments was among the rights retained by the people.
It was affirmed in one form or another in every state constitution that preceded the
Constitution.44  The problem with this reference in Amar’s discussion is that it
appears to reduce the Ninth Amendment to this particular collective right as its “core
meaning” without anysupport whatsoever for this interpretive claim.  Given that only
one state ratification convention proposed its addition to the Constitution while the
rest making recommendations were silent on this right,45 the lack of any other
affirmative evidence for this claim is telling.
Another example is the following passage in Russell Caplan’s article:
For the federalists, the Bill of Rights was a concession to skeptics, merely making
explicit the protection of rights that has always been implicit.  The unenumerated
rights retained under the ninth amendment were to continue in force as before, as
the operative laws of the states.  Unenumerated rights were not federal rights, as
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46Caplan, supra note 12, at  243 (emphasis added).  One needs to search elsewhere in
Caplan’s article to discover that the quoted phrase “legislative regulation” in this passage is from
Federalist No.83 in which Hamilton explains that, in the then-unamended Constitution, the right of
trial by jury was left to the states to protect.  Not only is Hamilton’s reference completely unconnected
to the Ninth Amendment, but it precedes the bill of rights by three years.  Moreover, as we shall see,
trial by jury was, according to Madison, a “positive right” that resulted from the compact, rather a
“natural right” that preceded the Constitution. See infra at notes 68-87.   Before the Bill of Rights,
all natural rights—including the freedom of speech, press, assembly and the rights to keep and bear
arms and to just compensation for public takings—were unenumerated.  None of this important nuance
is discussed by Caplan.
47See 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 75 (2d ed. 1989) (“crucial: . . . 2.  That finally
decides between two rival hypotheses, proving the one and disproving the other; more loosely, relating
to, or adapted to lead to such decision. . . .   This sense is taken from Bacon’s phrase instantia crucis,
explained by him as a metaphor from a crux or finger-post at a bivium or bifurcation of a road.  Boyle
were the enumerated rights, but represented the persistence of the “legislative
regulation” of the states.46
The first of these sentences is unproblematic, as is the second until its concluding
phrase “as the operative laws of the states.”  The third sentence is highly contentious.
None of these three sentences is accompanied by footnotes of support.
So too with Caplan’s claim that natural rights were subject to the regulation
of state laws—especially the common law.  So they were thought to be.  The question
is whether this means that the Ninth Amendment provided no constitutional barrier
to the federal interference with the exercise of these rights, as did the enumerated
natural rights of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and to keep and bear
arms—natural rights that were also regulated by state laws.  Evidence for this
interpretive claim is completely lacking.
Still, readers grow understandably impatient over this or that omission of
support and may even give up their pursuit of original meaning in frustration over
their inability to referee such arcana.  This is why, when direct evidence of particular
usage is unavailable (unlike, for example, with the Commerce Clause), the
formulations of clear models is essential as a first step to adjudicating a dispute over
original meaning.  With these models in mind, we can then survey a series of highly
salient and probative pieces of evidence to see which model or models fits them most
closely and which are actually refuted by the existence of this evidence.  While each
of the models fits the general history of the Ninth Amendment, each does not fit
equally well these particular items of evidence.  Evaluating the compatibility of these
clear models against this body of evidence makes possible the historical equivalent
of a “crucial experiment” in the natural sciences.47  So I now turn to the particular
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and Newton used the phrase experimentum crucis.  These give ‘crucial instance’, ‘crucial experiment’,
whence the usage has been extended.”). 
48JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 447 (emphasis added).
49In addition, Madison responded to the objection that the existence of state bills of rights
made a federal bill of rights unnecessary:
I admit the force of this observation, but I do not look upon it to be conclusive. In
the first place, it is too uncertain ground to leave this provision upon, if a provision
is at all necessary to secure rights so important as many of those I have mentioned
are conceived to be, by the public in general, as well as those in particular who
opposed the adoption of this constitution. Beside some states have no bills of rights,
there are others provided with very defective ones, and there are others whose bills
of rights are not only defective, but absolutely improper; instead of securing some
in the full extent which republican principles would require, they limit them too
items of historical evidence that are most telling in supporting or undercutting these
five models. 
A.  Madison’s Bill of Rights Speech
Without doubt, to establish the original public meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, we should begin with Madison’s speech to the House in which he
specifically explains the purpose of his initial proposal that morphed into the Ninth
Amendment.  As was discussed in Part II, Federalists made two objections to adding
a bill of rights to the Constitution.  The first was that it was unnecessary because
Congress was only given specific enumerated powers.  Here is how Madison
responds to this objection in his speech:
I admit that these arguments are not entirely without foundation; but they are not
conclusive to the extent which has been supposed. It is true the powers of the
general government are circumscribed; they are directed to particular objects; but
even if government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers
with respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the same
manner as the powers of the state governments under their constitutions may to an
indefinite extent; because in the constitution of the United States there is a clause
granting to Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof. . . .48
In other words, an enumeration of rights is useful to limit the exercise of enumerated
powers, especially given the existence of the Necessary and Proper Clause.49
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50JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 449.
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52Id. at 443 (emphasis added). I emphasize here the portion of this proposal that clearly
connects it with the final version of the Amendment.  We shall consider the other language in the
proposal in due time.
The second Federalist objection to a bill of rights was that it would be
dangerous—or, as Madison stated in his speech,
that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage
those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow, by
implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be
assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently
insecure.  
Characterizing this objection as “one of the most plausible arguments I have ever
heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system,”50 Madison then
makes the following crucial assertion: “but, I conceive, that may be guarded against.
I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the 4th
resolution.”51  The “last clause of the 4th resolution” to which Madison referred was,
by all accounts, the precursor of the Ninth Amendment that read (as was previously
quoted):
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights
retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution;
but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.52
All by itself, Madison’s characterization of the problem for which the Ninth
Amendment was his solution substantially undercuts Russell Caplan’s thesis that the
Ninth Amendment was added to address the concerns of Antifederalists that the
Constitution would supplant state law rights.  According to Madison, the Ninth
Amendment was formulated specifically to respond to the completely different
objection by Federalists to adding a bill of rights, which Antifederalists were
themselves advocating over Federalist objections.   But there is another more subtle
implication of Madison’s argument.  
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53It is tricky to consider portions of Madison’s speech that stress the reasons to enumerate
certain rights, without paying adequate attention to the inference from Madison’s explanation of the
precursor to the Ninth Amendment.  So elsewhere in his speech, Madison contends that:  
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be
an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or
executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.
Id. at ___ (emphasis added).  Raoul Berger claims that this establishes that only enumerated rights are
subject to judicial review. See Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELLL.REV. 1, 9 (1980).
While Madison’s statement is consistent with Berger’s claim, it by no means says this and must be
read together with Madison’s reasons for including the Ninth Amendment that immediately precede
this statement in his speech—in particular his denial that “it might follow, by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General
Government, and were consequently insecure.”  Still, Madison proved prescient here, as elsewhere.
Judges have traditionally felt more comfortable resisting encroachments upon enumerated rights than
they do those that are not expressly stipulated. 
Madison first emphasizes the need for enumerating rights to limit “the
means” by which the enumerated powers are exercised, especially under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.  He then adds the Ninth Amendment to avoid any
implication that those rights that were not enumerated were surrendered up to the
general government and were consequently insecure.  This raises the inference that
the unenumerated rights likewise limit the means by which federal powers are
exercised.53  This inference is borne out, as we shall see, by Madison’s actual use of
the Ninth Amendment in his Bank Speech to the First Congress when arguing against
a latitudinarian interpretation of the enumerated powers and, in particular, the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
One may also reasonably conclude that, since the enumerated rights were
individual in nature so too would be the unenumerated rights retained by the people.
For it was the enumeration of certain individual rights that might lead to a
construction that other comparable rights were surrendered up to the general
government and were consequently insecure.  But this conclusion need not rest solely
on inference.  It is also supported by how the Federalists formulated their argument
that enumerating any rights would be dangerous.  The precise nature of their
objection favors some models of the Ninth Amendment and disfavors others.
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542 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERALSTATE CONSTITUTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 454 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d. ed. 1836) (remarks of James Wilson)[hereinafter ELLIOT’S
DEBATES].
552 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 388 (Merrill
Jensen ed.,1976)(statement of James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28,
1787).
564 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 316 (Friday, January 18, 1788).
B.  The Federalist Objection to the Danger of a Bill of Rights
In a speech, widely discussed at the time, James Wilson defended the
proposed Constitution against those who complained about the absence of a bill of
rights.  For Wilson, it was the impracticality of identifying all the rights that survive
the delegation of powers to Congress that was the source of danger: 
All the political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf down to Vattel, have treated
on this subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the aggregate of them all, can
you find a complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the people as men and as
citizens. . . .  Enumerate all the rights of men!  I am sure, sir, that no gentleman in
the late Convention would have attempted such a thing.54
Before the Pennsylvania ratification convention, Wilson clarified the danger still
further: 
In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly
enumerated.  A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the
powers reserved.  If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated
is presumed to be given.  The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would
throw all implied power into the scale of the government; and the rights of the
people would be rendered incomplete.55
The same danger was warned against by Charles Pinckney in the South
Carolina House of Representatives:  
[W]e had no bill of rights inserted in our Constitution: for, as we might perhaps
have omitted the enumeration of some of our rights, it might hereafter be said we
had delegated to the general government a power to take away such of our rights as
we had not enumerated.56
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Then there is the even more colorful explanation of the danger by future Supreme
Court Justice James Iredell to the North Carolina ratification convention: 
[I]t would not only be useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of rights
which are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the
strongest manner, that every right not included in the exception might be impaired
by the government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to enumerate
every one.  Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases,
I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.57
Given that Madison’s Bill of Rights Speech to the House directly connects
his proposed precursor to the Ninth Amendment to this specific Federalist concern
about adding a bill of rights, what does it tell us about the merits or demerits of the
five models?  First, none of these protests make any direct connection to state law
rights, or the rights of the people in their respective states.  Although such rights
might well have been included in the impossible-to-enumerate rights retained by the
people, these quotes fail to reveal any hint that the retained rights are limited to state
constitutional or common law rights.  While these quotes do not directly contradict
the state-law rights model, therefore, they offer scant support for it.
Second, these quotes undercut the residual rights model of the Ninth
Amendment, according to which the rights of the people are defined residually by
what remains after the delegation of federal powers and these rights play no role
whatsoever in the definition or limitation of those powers.  The thrust of these
Federalist objections is that the people retain myriad rights that may not, in Iredell’s
words, “be impaired” by Congress “without usurpation.”  Given that the Federalists
were arguing at this juncture against any enumeration in the constitution of certain
rights, the then-unenumerated rights retained by the people to which they referred
included the natural rights of speech, press, assembly and to keep and bear arms.  
Federalists were contending that these rights and all others were best
protected by leaving them unenumerated.  That these rights eventually came to be
enumerated did not, therefore, add to their status as rights that may not “be impaired
by the government without usurpation.”  They had this status for the two years after
the adoption of the Constitution, and before the ratification of the First and Second
Amendments.  All other rights retained by the people to which Wilson, Pinckney and
Iredell referred, therefore, retained their power-constraining status after the Ninth
Amendment that they held before, and this was the very same status as the rights of
speech, press and assembly.  Indeed, preventing “any implication, that those rights
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59James Wilson, “Of the Natural Rights of Individuals,” in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
307 ( J. D. Andrews ed., 1896).
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure” was the express purpose
offered by Madison for adding the provision that eventually became the Ninth
Amendment.  In other words, enumerating a right did not somehow elevate its legal
status, and therebydiminish the just importance, or denyor disparage, the other rights
not enumerated.  I know of not a single figure from the Founding who asserted
clearly that enumerated rights would or did hold an enhanced legal status that
unenumerated rights lacked.58
Therefore the precise nature of this Federalist objection constitutes key
evidence strongly supporting the conclusion that the rights retained by the people
were neither state law rights that Congress could freely restrict under the Supremacy
Clause, or whatever rights were left over after the delegation of powers the scope of
which was defined solely by the delegation itself.  The Bill of Rights did not change
the legal status of the previously unenumerated rights.  Their enumeration in the Bill
of Rights did not make previously unenforceable natural rights enforceable; they
were enforceable all along.  This entails that those rights that remained unenumerated
remained as enforceable as those singled out for enumeration.
What about the individual and collective natural rights models?  While these
quotes do not definitively establish the precise nature of the rights to which the
speakers were referring, they do offer some hints.  For example, in Wilson’s speech,
he refers to “rights appertaining to the people as men and as citizens” and “the rights
of men.”  The latter formulation’s reference to “rights appertaining to the people as
men” seems clearly to evoke individual natural rights—a subject on which Wilson
lectured at the University of Pennsylvania.  
“Government, in my humble opinion,” wrote Wilson in his published
lectures, “should be formed to secure and to enlarge the exercise of the natural rights
of its members; and every government, which has not this in view, as its principal
object, is not a government of the legitimate kind.”59  Nor for Wilson were these mere
“theoretical” or “philosophical” rights with no enforceable bite:
Randy E. Barnett The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says Page 30
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of the Constitution, Americans had lost their Lockean and revolutionary ardor for natural rights in
favor of a more conservative Blackstonian positivism that favored legislative supremacy.
614 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 167 (James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying
Convention, Tuesday, July 29, 1788).
I go farther; and now proceed to show, that in peculiar instances, in which those
rights can receive neither protection nor reparation from civil government, they are,
notwithstanding its institution, entitled still to that defence, and to those methods of
recovery, which are justified and demanded in a state of nature.  The defence of
one’s self, justly called the primary law of nature, is not, nor can it be abrogated by
any regulation of municipal law.60
True, in his speech Wilson refers as well to the “rights appertaining to the people .
. . as citizens,” but even here this seems to evoke individual political rights, as
opposed to some collective right of the people as a whole.  At most, it suggests that
both individual and collective rights were retained by the people.
Similarly suggestive of individual natural rights is Iredell’s challenge to: “Let
any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately
mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.”61  He is obviously not
talking about some core or primary right of the people collectively to alter and
abolish their government, or a singular right of the people to govern themselves in
their states.  Contrary to the arguments of the Federalists, these two rights would be
easy to enumerate.  
Indeed, if the Ninth Amendment was meant to protect only one or both of
these “collective” rights to be exercised collectively, it would have been relatively
simple to enumerate them in the Bill of Rights!  Yet, Iredell nevertheless emphasizes
the impossibility of such an enumeration and the literally limitless nature of these
retained rights.  No matter how long a list anyone might propose, he could name
twenty or thirty more.  Of what sort of rights could he possibly have been thinking?
Because it suggests an answer to this question, I consider the next key piece of
evidence outside its chronological appearance.
C.  The Sedgwick-Benson-Page Exchange in the First Congress
Before considering the evidence provided by the amendments proposed by
state ratification conventions and the drafting history of the Ninth Amendment itself,
it is worth considering an exchange that took place on the floor of Congress during
the debate over what eventually became (after renumbering) the First Amendment.
Randy E. Barnett The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says Page 31
621 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Sedgwick). 
63Id. (statement of Rep. Benson).
64Id. at  759-60 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
For this exchange provides an explanation of how Iredell could claim that the rights
retained by the people were effectively unenumerable.
During the debate on the proposed inclusion of the right of assembly in what
eventually became the First Amendment (but was originally proposed to the states
as the third amendment), Representative Theodore Sedgwick objected on the grounds
that “it is a self-evident, unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly a
thing that never would be called in question; it is derogatory to the dignity of the
House to descend to such minutia. . . .”62  Notice that Sedgwick identifies the right
of assembly as an “inalienable right,” which is terminology that is used to describe
certain natural rights.  
This inference is reinforced by the reply to Sedgwick’s objection by
Representative Egbert Benson replied:  “The committee who framed this report
proceeded on the principle that these rights belonged to the people; they conceived
them to be inherent; and all they meant to provide against was their being infringed
by the Government.”63  That “inherent” rights was a synonym for natural rights can
be seen in Sedgwick’s next response to Benson: 
[I]f the committee were governed by that general principle, they might have gone
into a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they might have declared that a man
should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when he
pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper. . . .64
Both examples of “inherent,” “self-evident,” and “unalienable” rights offered by
Sedgwick could only be described as personal and individual.  His examples of these
types of rights well-illustrate how Iredell could boast that, for every list of right, no
matter how long, he could name twenty or thirty more. 
Representative John Page’s reply to Sedgwick defending the inclusion of the
right of assembly in the Bill of Rights reinforced the fact that Sedgwick’s examples
of personal individual “inherent” liberty rights were on a par with the right of
assembly.
[L]et me observe to him that such rights have been opposed, and a man has been
obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared before the face of authority; people
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65Id. at 760 (statement of Rep. Page).
66For a discussion of the founding generation’s view of “trivial rights,” see Philip A.
Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1994).
671 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at  759 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
68Id. at. 760 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
have also been prevented from assembling together on their lawful occasions,
therefore it is well to guard against such stretches of authority, by inserting the
privilege in the declaration of rights.65
Sedgwick’s original objection was that the Constitution should not be
cluttered with a potentially endless list of trifling rights66 that “would never be called
in[to] question”67 and were not “intended to be infringed.”68  In a very real sense, he
considered the right of assembly to be too fundamental (and unlikely to be infringed)
to justify inclusion in a bill of rights. As revealed by his two examples, Sedgwick’s
argument assumes that the “self-evident, unalienable,” inherent and unenumerated
rights retained by the people are personal liberty rights that are unenumerable
because the human imagination is limitless.  All the actions one might freely take
with what is rightfully his or hers can never be specified or reduced to a list.  It
includes the right to wear a hat, to get up when one pleases and go to bed when one
thinks proper, to scratch one’s nose when it itches (and even when it doesn’t), to eat
steak when one has a taste for it, or take a sip of Diet Mountain Dew when one is
thirsty.  Make any list of liberty rights you care to and one can always add twenty or
thirty more.
In choosing among the proposed models of the Ninth Amendment, this
exchange is telling, especially when combined with the Federalist objection to
enumerating any rights, which is directly linked to Madison’s stated rationale for the
Ninth Amendment.  None of the three congressmen make any reference to state
constitutional or common law rights (though, of course, the right to wear a hat and
to go to bed when one things proper is protected by the common law governing
person and property).   The state-law rights model does not fit well with this
exchange, an exchange that goes unmentioned in Caplan’s article.  
Nor does it square with the residual rights model.  Sedgwick and Page both
are referring to specific identifiable rights.  They are not referring to anything that
might simply be left over after an enumeration of powers.  And Page’s defense of the
right of assembly suggests that this right would restrict the exercise of delegated
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powers.  Indeed, his reply even intimates that the inherent, though unenumerated,
rights to wear one’s hat and go to bed when one thinks proper could also restrict the
proper exercise of delegated powers—though he does not propose adding them to the
Constitution.
This exchange also stands in sharp contrast with the collective natural rights
model.  Here the congressmen are clearly talking about personal individual rights and
they do so while invoking the supposedly collective term “the people.”  Sedwick
specifically characterizes the right of assembly as “a self-evident, unalienable right
which the people possess” and “that these rights belonged to the people; they
conceived them to be inherent.”  Benson counters with the personal individual
inherent right to wear a hat and go to bed when one thinks proper as rights belonging
to the people.  Page then underscores the equivalence of these personal rights with
that of the right of assembly.  At least in this exchange, all these personal individual
rights were thought by all three Congressmen to appertain to “the people.”  Page even
uses the term “people” here to refer to the plural of individual persons, rather than as
some mystical corporate body. 
To recap:  We have now connected Madison’s explanation of the purpose of
the Ninth Amendment to Federalist objections that a bill of rights would be
dangerous.  To appreciate the nature of that danger, we need to appreciate that
Wilson and the others were referring to natural rights.  To see why an enumeration
of natural rights must inevitably be dangerously incomplete, we examined the debate
in the House about the meaning of inherent rights.  But the evidence that the rights
“retained by the people” in the Ninth Amendment was a reference to inherent or
natural rights does not end here.  Two additional pieces of evidence suggest the same
conclusion and return us to the legislative history leading up to the Ninth
Amendment’s enactment into law.
D.  Madison’s Notes For His Bill of Rights Speech
According to the individual natural rights model of the Ninth Amendment,
the rights retained by the people is a reference to natural rights, and the purpose of
the Amendment is to ensure that these rights are treated on a par with the natural
rights that happen to have been expressly included in the Bill of Rights.  This model,
then, depends on the claim that at least some of the rights in the Bill of Rights were
natural, inherent or retained rights, as was evidenced by the exchange in the House
between Representatives Benson, Sedgwick and Page.  
What of Madison’s Bill of Rights speech to the House?  In his speech,
Madison describes his proposed amendments as including three categories of rights:
Randy E. Barnett The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says Page 34
69JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 445.  I have inserted the numbers in brackets
to demarcate the three types of rights that were included in the enumeration.
70Madison’s Notes for Amendments Speech 1789 in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THEPEOPLE:
THEHISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 64 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (underlining
in original)[hereinafter MADISON’S NOTES].  From the published accounts of his speech, Madison did
not get to all six categories on his list.  Perhaps because he was going long.  In the margins of the notes
for his speech, we find the following notation: “watch Time”!  An image of the notes (showing the
underlining of “natural rights”) can be viewed at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/madison/images/vc11.jpg
In some instances they assert [1] those rights which are exercised by the people in
forming and establishing a plan of government. In other instances, they specify [2]
those rights which are retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised
by the legislature. In other instances, they specify [3] positive rights, which may
seem to result from the nature of the compact. Trial by jury cannot be considered
as a natural right, but a right resulting from the social compact which regulates the
action of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any
one of the pre-existent rights of nature.69
By distinguishing the “positive rights” in the third category from “natural rights” or
the “pre-existent rights of nature,” this passage strongly suggests that the second
category of “rights which are retained” are indeed natural rights.
Confirmation of this suggestion, along with an example of the rights to which
Madison was referring as those “which are retained,” is provided by his notes for this
speech in which the following appears: 
Contents of Bill of Rgts.
1.  Assertion of primitive equality &c.
2.  do. of rights exerted in formg Govts.
3.  natural rights retained as speach [illegible].
4.  positive rights resultg. as trial by jury.
5.  Doctrinl. artics vs Depts. distinct electn.
6.   moral precepts for the administration. & natl.character—as
justice—economy—&c.70
These notes provide critical evidence that the other rights “retained by the
people” to which Madison’s proposal and the final version of the Ninth Amendment
refer are indeed inherent or natural rights.  For Madison himself writes in his own
hand the term “natural rights retained.”  These natural retained rights are to be
distinguished from “positive rights” that result from the enactment of the
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71JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 443.
72Id.
73Id. at 445.
74In the published reports of his speech (as fully quoted above), Madison gives no examples
of these rights. This vital information is provided by his notes.
75I am a bit skeptical that the so-called “collective” rights to which Professors Amar and Lash
refer were of a different order than the natural individual rights.  In a sense, Amar agrees when he tries
to treat even individual rights as collective.  In contrast, I would treat political rights as individual in
nature.  But I will not try to establish this point in this article and, for present purposes, merely assume
that political rights, such as the right to form and establish governments are somehow “collective” in
nature as Amar and Lash contend.
76Id. at 448-449.
Constitution and its amendments.  The bill of rights is not the source of these natural
rights, but they are added to the text of the Constitution, as his proposal reads, “for
greater caution.”71  In contrast, the positive rights that result from the compact or
Constitution provide “actual limitations of such powers”72 as are delegated to
Congress.
Crucially, these natural rights retained “when particular powers are given up
to be exercised by the legislature”73 include the individual enumerated right of
freedom of speech.74  In both his notes and speech, such rights are explicitly
distinguished by Madison from the political “rights which are exercised by the people
in forming and establishing a plan of government” that both Akhil Amar and Kurt
Lash refer to as “collective” in their model.75  When combined with Madison’s
explanation of the Ninth Amendment that soon follows in his speech, this is excellent
evidence that the rights retained by the people to which the Ninth Amendment refers
are individual rights like speech, rather than the political rights he separately lists.
For later he refers to the danger that
by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those
rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow, by
implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be
assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently
insecure.76
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80JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 444.
81MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 70, at 64.  There is no “second” that follows.  Next in his
notes is a different point: “Bill of Rights—useful not essential—fallacy in both sides. . . .” Id.  I have
enhanced the positioning of the text by referring directly to the image of Madison’s notes. See supra,
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In other words, it is the enumeration in the Constitution of such individual rights as
freedom of speech that threatens to render insecure other comparable rights “which
were not singled out.”
I do not wish to make too much of this point.  Because I think that the right
of the people to establish or alter governments—what Lash calls “political”
rights—are both individual and natural rights, I see no problem with their inclusion
among the rights retained by the people to which the Ninth Amendment refers.
Nevertheless, this passage of Madison’s speech and notes undercuts Akhil Amar’s
confident claim—unsupported as it is by any evidence—that the “core meaning [of
“the People”] in the Ninth is . . .  collective”77 and that “the most obvious and
inalienable right underlying the Ninth Amendment is the collective right of We the
People to alter or abolish government, through the distinctly American device of the
constitutional convention.”78  Madison’s notes seriously undercut Amar’s claim.
Also undercut by Madison’s speech and notes is Amar’s conclusion that: “To see the
Ninth Amendment, as originally written, as a palladium of countermajoritarian
individual rights—like privacy—is to engage in anachronism.”79
Amar’s accusation of anachronism is further undermined by a different
portion of Madison’s notes for his bill of rights speech.  In the published report of his
speech, immediately after reading his proposed amendments, Madison says, “The
first of these amendments, relates to what may be called a bill of rights. . . .”80
However, his notes for this part of his speech cast this statement in a more
individualistic light:
Read the amendments —
They relate 1st. to private rights —.81
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82This sentence also suggests that not all the amendments or proposed changes were
conceived by Madison as “what may be called a bill of rights,” by which is meant a list of particular
rights.  Others provisions, such as Ninth and Tenth Amendments, were rules by which governmental
powers and the enumeration of certain rights were to be construed.
83Two additional very brief press reports of Madison’s speech in The Daily Advertiser (June
9, 1789) and The New-York Daily Gazette (June 9 1789) offer no details of its content, though the
former characterizes Madison’s speech as “long and able” while the latter referred to it as “a very
lengthy discussion.” reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THEFIRSTFEDERALCONGRESS, 1789-
1791, at 804 (William Charles DiGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995)[hereinafter 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS].
84Lash, supra note 2, at 388 (“To those who argued that Congress could act for the ‘general
welfare’ so long as it did not interfere with the powers of the States, Madison responded that
chartering a bank ‘would directly interfere with the rights of the States, to prohibit as well as establish
banks.’... it was the collective rights of the people of the several states which were threatened by the
Bill.”).
Combining the speech as reportedly delivered with this passage of the notes
strongly suggests, though it does not prove, that the “first of these amendments [that]
relates to what may be called a bill of rights”82 are “private rights.”  And the stated
purpose of the Ninth Amendment is to protect the “other” retained natural rights from
the inference that they were assigned into the hands of the general government and
were consequently insecure.  There is no indication whatsoever that these other
retained natural rights were of a different order than the “private” rights to which
Madison referred.  Indeed, the most obvious danger posed by enumerating some
private rights is that other private rights would be denied or disparaged.  Therefore,
it is hardly anachronistic to conclude that the uneumerated rights retained by the
people were every bit as individual and private as the rights that were included on his
list.
Moreover, in a different and much truncated report of his Bill of Rights
speech in the Gazette of the United States,83 Madison contrasts the powers of
states—which Kurt Lash sometimes identifies with the collective rights of the
people84— with that of the natural rights retained by the people: 
It has been observed, that the Constitution does not repeal the State bills of rights;
to this may be replied, that some of the States are without any—and that articles
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85GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), June 10, 1789, reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY
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commonly used and far more detailed account, the explicit reference to natural rights is omitted:
Beside some states have no bills of rights, there are others provided with very
defective ones, and there are others whose bills of rights are not only defective, but
absolutely improper; instead of securing some in the full extent which republican
principles would require, they limit them too much to agree with the common ideas
of liberty.
Yet combining the two yields a strong association of the “rights of human nature” with the “common
ideas of liberty.”
86It is not, but ought to have been, among the evidence I compiled and evaluated in Randy
E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 185
(2003).
87JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 447-448.
contained in those that have them, are very improper, and infringe upon the  rights
of human nature, in several respects.85
This passage does not mesh well with the claim that the Ninth Amendment, devised
by Madison, merely referred to state bills of rights, as is contended by the state law
rights model.  Nor is it consistent with the residual rights model.  According to
Madison here, natural rights are not simply what is left over after a delegation of
powers to government.  Instead even constitutional delegations of powers are
“improper” when they “infringe upon the rights of human nature.”  In this manner,
natural rights provide a way of evaluating governmental powers, whether express or
implied.
By the same token, this passage of Madison’s speech concerning state bills
of rights sheds light on the original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause,86
which elsewhere in his speech Madison cites as a reason why a bill of rights is
needed even with a government of enumerated powers.87 In this passage, Madison
explicitly contends that a power contained in an “article” of a state constitution that
infringes upon the rights of human nature—which we know also as the rights retained
by the people—is  “improper.”  What is true of a power expressly, though
improperly, granted to state governments by their constitutions, is surely equally true
of a claim of implied power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Thus, according
to Madison, laws that violate the retained “rights of nature” are improper.  As we
shall see, Madison did not hesitate to rely on the rule of construction provided by,
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88For a general discussion of this clause, see Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger,
The”Proper” Scope of  Federal Police Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping
Clause, 43 DUKE L. J.  267 (1993).
89See Scott D. Gerber, Roger Sherman and the Bill of Rights, 28 POLITY 521, 530-
531(summer 1996).  Gerber supplies an itemized comparison of Sherman’s draft with both Madison’s
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represent Sherman’s own view, but more likely was a draft showing how a bill of rights could be
inter alia, the Ninth Amendment to criticize a claim of implied power under what was
derisively known then as “the Sweeping Clause.”88
Lest there be any methodological confusion, my extensive examination of
Madison’s Bill of Rights speech, including his notes, is not a reliance on his private
original intent.  It is instead strong evidence of the public meaning of the words used
in the Ninth Amendment—a provision which, as we have seen, he devised to meet
the very public Federalist objections to enumerating any rights in a bill of rights.
None of the claims or usages by Madison which I have emphasized here were
contradicted by anyone else in Congress after his speech (though other congressmen
did strongly contest the need for a bill of rights or whether then was the right time to
draft one).  Moreover, Madison’s usages and views were shared by others, as
evidenced by the Sedgwick-Benson-Page exchange (and other evidence yet to be
discussed).  
Even if Madison’s speech and notes were relevant only to his private beliefs,
they would still undercut the charge by Akhil Amar that it is anachronistic to attribute
these views to the founders.  To the contrary, what may indeed be anachronistic is
some hard distinction between “individual” and “collective” rights, a distinction that
does not appear explicitly in the sources.  The closest one comes to this distinctions
is Madison’s contention that the first portion of the Bill of Rights refers to “private”
rights, as contrasted to the political rights that are first on his list.  But I must leave
the evaluation of this possible anachronism to the future.
E.  Roger Sherman’s Draft Bill of Rights
Madison’s speech is not the only evidence we have that the public meaning
of rights “retained by the people” is that of natural rights belonging to individuals.
Serving with Madison on the Select Committee to draft a bill of rights was Roger
Sherman, a representative from Connecticut.  In the 1980s, there was found among
Madison’s papers, a draft of a bill of rights that was eventually attributed to
Sherman.89  Sherman’s second amendment reads as follows:
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appended to the end of the Constitution, rather than inserted within as Madison had originally
proposed.  Sherman’s sustained opposition to a bill of rights in general, and this draft proposal in
particular, has no bearing however on the significance of this draft as evidence of the original meaning
of the phrase “rights . . . retained by the people.”  This is a good example of how evidence bearing on
original intent, e.g. Sherman’s opposition to the proposed amendments, would be wholly irrelevant
to evidence of original public meaning provided by the words he chose to use in his proposal.
90Roger Sherman’s Draft of the Bill of Rights, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 351
(Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
91See Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Constitutional?, 100 YALE L.J.
1073, 1075 (1991).
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they enter
into Society, Such are the rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring
property, and of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing
their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult
their common good, and of applying to Government by petition or remonstrance for
redress of grievances.  Of these rights therefore they Shall not be deprived by the
Government of the united States.90
Like Madison’s notes, this provision explicitly links the concept of “natural rights”
with that of rights “retained” by “The people”—all of which appear in its first
sentence.  And the examples of these rights that follow—which is not meant to be
exclusive (“Such are”)—include the undeniably individual rights of conscience,
acquiring property, and of pursuing happiness and safety, freedom of speech, writing
and publishing.  The rights to peaceably assemble and petition government could be
construed as “collective” rights, but they could equally well be thought to belong to
individuals, who are then free to band together and exercise their rights in a common
cause.  Only a portion of these rights were enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  The
Ninth Amendment appears designed to protect the others, not enumerated, from
being ignored or treated in any inferior manner, i.e. denied or disparaged.
Sherman’s proposal not only strongly supports an individual natural rights
reading of the words “retained” rights, but is also incompatible with both the state
law rights and residual rights models.  None of these rights to which Sherman’s
proposal refers are state law rights (though they may well have been regulated by
state law).  Instead they are “natural rights which are retained by [the People] when
they enter into Society.”  Nor are these rights defined residually by the enumeration
of powers.  Instead, they are identified by name.
Sherman’s identification of these natural rights was commonplace.91  Another
example of this list of individual private rights can be found in the first paragraph of
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proposal in the Senate echoes those made by some states who proposed amendments. For example,
this was proposed as the first amendment by the Virginia convention:
1st. That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a social
compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity; among which are the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 636. New York’s  proposal contained similar
natural rights language:
“That the enjoyment of Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness are essential rights which
every Government ought to respect and preserve.” 
Id. at 635.  Many state constitutions contained similar language, as well.  Massachusetts (“All men are
born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.” Id. at 637),
New Hampshire (“All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights; among which are - the
enjoying and defending life and liberty - acquiring, possessing and protecting property - and in a word,
of seeking and obtaining happiness.” Id. at 637-638), New York (“We hold these Truths to be self-
evident, that all Men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” Id. at 638), Pennsylvania
(“That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and
unalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending of life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” Id. at 639), and
Vermont (“That all Men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and
unalienable Rights, amongst which are the enjoying and defending Life and Liberty; acquiring,
possessing and protecting Property, and pursuing and obtaining Happiness and Safety.” Id. at 640.)
another proposed list of amendments as inscribed in the Senate Legislative Journals
on September 8, 1789:
That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a social
compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.92
What makes Sherman’s draft particularlysignificant is its explicit linkage of the term
“natural rights” with “retained by them”—with “them” referring to “the
People”—and the individual personal rights it then provides as examples.  
To be clear, I do not claim that Sherman’s proposed second amendment is a
direct precursor of the Ninth Amendment.  Instead, it shows rather dramatically how
those in Congress during the drafting process thought of natural rights.  First, natural
rights were individual, personal or private rights, as evidenced by the examples
enumerated by Sherman.  Second, at this level of generality, those who enter into
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social compacts cannot deprive or divest their posterity of these natural rights
regardless of the powers they may delegate to government.  They are, in other words,
inalienable.93  For all these reasons, Sherman’s draft is inconsistent with the state-law
rights and residual rights models, as well as any suggestion that the rights retained
by the people were exclusively “collective” or “political” in nature.
F.  Proposed Rights and Amendments by State Ratification Conventions
After a bill of rights was promised by supporters of the Constitution to avoid
a second constitutional convention, state ratification conventions began
accompanying their resolutions ratifying the Constitution with lists of rights (and
various other amendments) they proposed be added after ratification.  While all Ninth
Amendment scholars have discussed these proposals, no one has placed greater stress
on their precise nature and scope than Kurt Lash.  Professor Lash traces the Ninth
Amendment to proposals made by some ratification conventions concerning how the
Constitution is to be construed.
He begins with the proposal made by New York:
[T]hat every Power, Jurisdiction and Right, which is not by the said Constitution
clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the
Government thereof, remains to the People of the several States, or to their
respective State Governments to whom they may have granted the same; 
    And that those Clauses in the said Constitution, which declare, that Congress
shall not have or exercise certain Powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to
any Powers not given by the said Constitution; but such Clauses are to be construed
either as exceptions to certain specified Powers, or as inserted merely for greater
Caution.94
The first paragraph concerns the reservation to the states of all powers not
“delegated” to Congress—as eventually did the Tenth Amendment.  The second
paragraph concerns how clauses limiting the powers of Congress should “be
construed,” which assists us, Lash contends, in interpreting the Ninth Amendment.
He finds a similar parallelism in the proposals from Virginia and North
Carolina.  Here are two of Virginia’s proposals:
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95Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788),  in THECOMPLETEBILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 675.
96Amendments Proposed by the North Carolina Convention (Aug. 1, 1788), in id., at 674-75:
    1.  That each state in the union shall, respectively, retain every power,
jurisdiction and right, which is not by this constitution delegated to the Congress of
the United States, or to the departments of the Federal Government. 
    . . . . 
    18. That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain
powers, be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever to extend the powers of
Congress; but that they be construed either as making exceptions to the specified
powers where this shall be the case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater
caution.
975 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
1786-1870, 176-77 (Department of State, 1905)[hereinafter 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION ].  Davie, a supporter of ratification, apparently wrote Madison to elicit a progress
report on the bill of rights. See id. at 177 (“I am extremely interested to know the progress of this
delicate and interesting business. . . [which] might perhaps be of some consequences to this country.
. . .”). 
First, That each State in the Union shall respectively retain every power,
jurisdiction and right which is not by this Constitution delegated to the Congress of
the United States or to the departments of the Foederal Government. 
. . . . 
Seventeeth, That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not
exercise certain powers be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever to extend the
powers of Congress.  But that they may be construed either as making exceptions
to the specified powers where this shall be the case, or otherwise as inserted merely
for greater caution.95
North Carolina identical proposal96 appears to have been merely copied from
Virginia’s (just as New Hampshire copied the proposals of Massachusetts).  As
William Davie of North Carolina wrote James Madison two days after Madison’s
Bill of Rights speech: “The farrago of amendments borrowed from Virginia is by no
means to be considered as the sense of this country; they were proposed amidst
violence and confusion of party heat, at a critical moment in our Convention, and
adopted by the opposition without one moment’s consideration.”97  North Carolina’s
1788 ratification convention adopted the Virginia proposals without ratifying the
Constitution;  it did not reconvene to actually ratify the Constitution until after
Madison’s Bill of Rights speech and after Congress finalized the proposed
amendments and referred them to the states for ratification.
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98Lash, supra note 2, at  358.  Lash sees a difference between the Virginia and North Carolina
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complementary strategy of controlling the interpreted scope of enumerated power.”  To my eyes, New
York’s proposals contain the same dual strategy that Lash identifies in Virginia and North Carolina.
99Id. at  359.
100Amendments Proposed by the Pennsylvania Convention (Sept. 3, 1788), in THECOMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 648.
Lash correctly observes that both forms of proposed amendments “reflect dual
strategies for controlling the expansion of federal power.  The primary strategy was
to declare the principle of enumerated federal power.  A secondary strategy was to
control the interpretation of enumerated federal power.”98  After identifying the dual
strategy for limiting federal power found in these proposals, Lash explains why a
simple reservations of rights not delegated was thought to be inadequate to limiting
federal power.  
The problem was, as the Antifederalists pointed out, merely declaring the principle
of enumerated powers by itself did not control the interpreted scope of federal
power.  There being no fixed rules of interpretation for the courts to follow, judicial
construction of enumerated powers had no limit.  Worse, adding a Bill of Rights
might imply that the only limits to broad readings of federal power were those
specific limits listed in Article I and the Bill of Rights.  In such a situation, states
still would retain all nondelegated powers, but those powers would be few (if any),
with the federal government having occupied the field. Preventing this from coming
to pass required the adoption of two provisions. One declaring the principle of
enumerated power; the second denying the implied expansion of federal power due
to the addition of specific rights.99
He then notes the other state conventions who submitted proposals to address
the construction of federal powers.  In addition to proposing that Congress “shall not
exercise any powers whatever, but such as are expressly given to that body by the
Constitution,” Pennsylvania also proposed prohibiting the executive and judicial
branches from assuming any “authority, power, or jurisdiction" under any “pretense
of construction or fiction.”100 South Carolina declared that “no section or paragraph
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101Ratification of the Constitution by the Convention of the State of South Carolina (May 23,
1788), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 325.
102Lash, supra note 2, at  358 (first emphasis added, second in original).
103One page later, Lash offers a more accurate summary:  “First, they declared that the federal
government had limited enumerated powers, with all nondelegated power, jurisdiction, and rights
retained by the states.  Second, the states proposed a rule of construction that preserved the retained
powers of the states by preventing the constructive expansion of federal power.” Id. at 359-60. 
of the said Constitution warrants a construction that the states do not retain every
power not expressly relinquished . . . .”101
Lash then summarizes this two-track approach of the states as follows: 
All of these declarations and proposals share a common dual approach to
controlling federal power.  First, a declaration must be added that expressly declares
the federal government has limited enumerated powers.  All powers, jurisdiction,
and rights not delegated to the federal government were to be retained by the states.
Second, the enumeration of certain rights was not to be construed in any manner
that expanded the scope of enumerated federal power.  Both the declarations and
the rules of construction focused on controlling the expansion of federal power and
reserving all nondelegated powers and rights to the states.102
But this summary greatly overstates the commonality of these proposals.103
True, there certainly appears to have been a dual strategy that mirrors the Tenth and
Ninth Amendments: (a) emphasize the delegated powers scheme as did the Tenth,
and (b) propose some rule of construction as did the Ninth.  But the precise nature
of the rule of construction recommended varied substantially, and this is precisely
what is at issue when interpreting the Ninth.  
To begin with, there is a major difference between the Virginia and New
York proposed rules of construction.  Virginia’s proposal speaks of the retention of
“every power, jurisdiction and right” in “each state in the union.”  In contrast, New
York speaks of “every Power, Jurisdiction and Right” remaining in “the People of
the several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom they may have
granted the same.”  In this manner, New York distinguished between “the People”
and “State Governments,” and reserves rights to the people, as opposed to Virginia’s
which refers only to reserving rights to the states. 
As seen in the quote above, Lash strongly implies that when the Ninth
Amendment speaks of “rights” that are “retained by the people,” this is a reference
to the “powers, jurisdiction, and rights . . . retained by the states” as well as by
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York's.” Id. at 359. But Rhode Island did not ratify the Constitution until after the Bill of Rights had
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Constitution was one of the purposes for proposing a Bill of Rights.
105THE COMPLETE BILLOF RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 674. (“That it be explicitly declared that
all powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several states, to
be by them exercised.”)
106Id. at 635-636.
1071 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 334 (May 29, 1790).
108Lash, supra note 2, at 360. 
109See 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, 279
(Charlene Bangs Bickford et al eds., 1992) (statement of Rep. Madison, August 15, 1789) (“I
concurred, in the convention of Virginia, with those gentlemen, so far as to agree to a declaration of
those rights which correspond to my own judgment, and the other alterations which I had the honor
to bring forward before the present congress.”).
individuals.  While the Virginia version does bear this construction, New York’s
does not.  According to New York, all power, jurisdiction and rights are retained by
the people (who may then allocate powers to their state governments).  Moreover,
Pennsylvania’s proposed rule of construction did not apply to the Congress at all, but
only to the executive and judicial branches of the federal government.  South
Carolina’s proposed rule of construction refers only to “powers” not rights.104
To round out the survey, while both the Massachusetts and the identical New
Hampshire recommendations contain a Tenth Amendment-like reference to delegated
powers,105 neither contains any guide to construing the power of Congress analogous
to the Ninth Amendment.106  Rhode Island accompanied its ratification with a
recommended revision similar to New York’s, but only ratified the Constitution
nearly a year after the Bill of Rights had been drafted by Congress and submitted to
the states for ratification.107
So in the end, Lash’s contention that the rule of construction proposed by the
state ratification conventions reserved rights (as distinct from powers) to the several
states (as distinct from the people) is limited to the proposal by Virginia, which was
copied verbatim by North Carolina.  Though Lash’s claim that, “[w]hen James
Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, he referred to and relied upon these proposals,”108
is likely correct,109 Madison had a diversity of proposals from which to draw
inspiration.  
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Reviewing Madison’s actual proposal to Congress shows that, while he does
indeed appear to be borrowing from those offered by the states, he deviated from
Virginia’s:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights
retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.110
Here, like New York, Madison refers only to the “rights retained by the people.”  He
does not refer, as does Virginia, to rights reserved or retained by the states—he does
not refer to states at all.  True, New York’s proposal also refers to powers retained
by the people, but the Tenth Amendment was eventually revised to include this as
well—to the consternation of some in Virginia, as will be discussed below.  Of
course the actual Ninth Amendment as enacted deviates still further from those
aspects of the state recommendations that Madison’s original proposal resembles. 
Before turning to the evidence provided by the Virginia debate, let me
summarize how the evidence provided by the state proposals supports or undercuts
the five originalist models.  None of the proposals discussed supports the state law
rights model.  However, Pennsylvania also proposed “that every reserve of rights of
individuals, made by the several states in the Union, shall remain inviolate, except
so far as they are expressly manifestly yielded or narrowed by the national
Constitution.”111  While this is a clear assertion of state law rights, it addresses the
effect of adopting the Constitution, not the effect of enumerating certain rights in the
Constitution, which is the subject of the Ninth Amendment.
The state proposals described above seriously undercut the residual rights
model.  That model claims that the Ninth Amendment tells us nothing about the
scope of federal powers, but merely restates the importance of enumerated powers.
Yet, each of the rules of construction recommended by the states were proposals for
how enumerated powers should be construed: narrowly, so as not to violate the
reserved powers, jurisdiction, or rights of the people or states (depending on the
particular formulation).
Only the Virginia/North Carolina proposal clearly fits the collective rights
model.  The proposals by Pennsylvania, South Carolina and especially New York are
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consistent instead with the individual natural rights model.  As we shall see, the
difference in the wording proposed by Virginia from the actual wording of the Ninth
Amendment, and Virginia’s reaction to that change, severelyundercuts the collective
rights model and strongly supports the individual rights model.  Finally, all these
proposals concerning the construction of federal powers provide strong support for
the federalism model, which is completely consistent with either the collective rights
or individual natural rights models or both.
G.  The Virginia Debates Over the Ninth Amendment
As we have just seen, Madison’s initial proposal looked in form very similar
to the rules of construction proposed by several state ratification conventions, though
in substance was more similar to New York’s than to Virginia’s.  Here, once more,
is Madison’s original formulation:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights
retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.112
Clearly borrowed from state proposals is the language, “or as to enlarge the powers
delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as
inserted merely for greater caution.”  Also taken from the proposals is the reference
to enumerated rights as “exceptions” to granted powers.  To the language proposed
by the states, Madison added a reference to provisions in the Constitution “made in
favor of particular rights” that does not appear in the state proposals concerning
construction.  Crucially, he also added the language, “shall not be so construed as to
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people.”  Unlike, New
York, this does not read “the People of the several states,” but simply “the people.”
Here, again, is the final form of the Ninth Amendment as it emerged from
Congress (as the eleventh proposed amendment) and was transmitted to the states for
ratification:
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The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.113
Gone now is any reference to “exceptions” to the powers of Congress.  In place of the
states’ proposed reference to “clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise
certain powers” is a reference to the “rights . . . retained by the people.”  In place of
the earlier draft’s language “shall not be so construed  . . . as to enlarge the powers
delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers” is the
language “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
In the amendments as proposed by Congress and ratified, the only explicit
reference to the reserved powers of states came in the Tenth Amendment—originally
the twelfth proposed amendment—which reads:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
This language is nearly identical to those recommended by every state ratification
convention that made proposals, with one difference: the unexplained addition by the
Senate of the words “or to the people” at the end.  While Virginia’s proposal
contained no analogue to this additional language, New York had included a
reference to “every Power . . . which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated
to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof,
remains to the People of the several States, or to their respective State Governments
to whom they may have granted the same.”114   However, whereas New York refers
to “the People of the several States,” the final version of the Tenth Amendment, like
the final version of the Ninth, refers simply to “the People.”
After Congress submitted its version of amendments to the states for
ratification, an interesting debate transpired in the Virginia legislature concerning the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which were then listed as the eleventh and twelfth
amendments.  The principal objection to the Ninth Amendment by Edmund
Randolph has been much discussed in the Ninth Amendment literature in the context
of Madison’s reply to a letter written to him by Hardin Burnley, a member of the
Virginia house.  On November 28, 1789, Burnley reported to Madison that, while the
first ten amendments “were acceeded [sic] to with but little opposition,” the last two
were rejected.  He then reported Randolph’s objection to the Ninth Amendment: 
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117Id. at 222 (‘the whole twelve were ratified.  They are now with the senate, who were
yesterday employed with them.”).  Randolph then predicted accurately, “That body will attempt to
postpone them; for a majority is unfriendly to the government.  But an effort will be made against this
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118Id. at 225 (letter of Edmund Randolph to George Washington, December 15, 1789).
Mr. E. Randolph who advocated all the others stood in this contest in the front of
the opposition.  His principle objection was pointed against the word retained in the
eleventh proposed amendment, and his argument if I understood it was applied in
this manner, that as the rights declared in the first ten of the proposed amendments
were not all that a free people would require the exercise of; and that as there was
no criterion by which it could be determined whither [sic] any other particular right
was retained or not, it would be more safe & consistent with the spirit of the 1st &
17th amendments proposed by Virginia, that this reservation against constructive
power, should operate rather as a provision against extending the powers of
Congress by their own authority, than as a protection to rights reducable [sic] to no
definitive certainty.115
On December 5th, Madison related Burnley’s report of Randolph’s objections to
George Washington,116 but on the verynext day, Randolph wrote Washington himself
to report that amendments had passed the Virginia house and were now before its
senate.117  Ten days later Randolph explained to Washington that: “It has been
thought by the mo[mutilated] zealous friends to the constitution to let the whole of
them rest.  I have submitted to their opinion; not choosing to rely upon my own
judgment in so momentous an affair.”118
In the Virginia senate, more dominated by Antifederalists, the amendments
had a tougher sledding.  The senate rejected the third (First), eight (Sixth), eleventh
(Ninth) and thirteenth (Tenth) amendments.  The reasons given for rejecting the
eleventh (the Ninth Amendment) were similar to those of Randolph, but add a
significant statement that pertains to its original public meaning.
We do not find that the IIth article is asked for by Virginia or any other State; we
therefore conceive that the people of Virginia should be consulted with respect to
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it, even if we did not doubt the propriety of adopting it; but it appears to us to be
highly exceptionable.119
In other words, the public meaning of the Ninth Amendment appeared so different
from anything proposed by Virginia’s ratification convention that the Virginians in
the Senate do not find it in their proposals.  This perceived difference in public
meaning is further reflected in their substantive objections to the new language: “If
it is meant to guard against the extension of the powers of Congress by implication,
it is greatly defective, and does by no means comprehend the idea expressed in the
17th article of amendments proposed by Virginia. . . .”120  Here they specifically find
that the meaning of the Ninth Amendment differs from that of their proposed
seventeenth.
This reaction in the Virginia senate is consistent with that of Virginia’s two
United States Senators who had previously reported the proposed amendments to the
Governor of Virginia accompanied by their stern disapproval.  “[I]it is with grief that
we now send forward propositions inadequate to the purpose of real and substantial
Amendments, and so far short of the wishes of our Country.  By perusing the Journal
of the Senate, your Excellency will see, that we did, in vain, bring to view the
Amendment proposed by our Convention, and approved by the Legislature.”121
Each senator also expressed this opinion even more vociferously in private
correspondence with Patrick Henry.  In the words of Senator William Grayson, “they
are so mutilated & gutted that in fact they are good for nothing, & I believe as many
others do, that they will do more harm than benefit: The Virginia amendments were
all brought into view, and regularly rejected.”122  And Senator Richard Henry Lee
explained: “As they came from the H. of R. they were very short of the wishes of our
Convention, but as they are returned by the Senate they are certainly much weakened.
You may be assured that nothing on my part was left undone to prevent this, and
every possible effort was used to give success to all the Amendments proposed by
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our Country—We might as well have tried to move Mount Atlas upon our
shoulders.”123
After complaining that the Ninth Amendment was completely new, the
Majority report in the Virginia senate then identifies the other rights retained by the
people as “personal” as opposed to collective, though they find the protection of
these rights deficient:  
and as it respects personal rights, [it] might be dangerous, because, should the rights
of the people be invaded or called into question, they might be required to shew by
the constitution what rights they have retained; and such as could not from that
instrument be proved to be retained by them, they might be denied to possess.  Of
this there is ground to be apprehensive, when Congress are already seen denying
certain rights of the people, heretofore deemed clear and unquestionable.124
Unfortunately, for our purposes, they provide no examples of such “denials” of
rights.  Note, however, their use of the term “deny” to connote violate or infringe
upon.
Of course, these Virginians proved prescient about the effectiveness of the
Ninth.  Under the modern approach to constitutional rights, as embodied in Footnote
Four, only the enumerated rights shift the presumption of constitutionality, unless a
litigant can establish that an unenumerated right is “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” or “deeply rooted in the nation’s traditions and history” and very few
unenumerated rights have been protected by this route.
Still, the effectiveness of the Ninth Amendment is one thing; its original
meaning is another.  And the report of the Virginia senate offers powerful evidence
that the replacement of the words of the seventeenth proposal by Virginia with that
of the actual Ninth Amendment represented a change in meaning from the protection
of state powers to the protection of “personal rights.”  The report of the minority in
the Virginia senate who supported ratifying all the amendments, including the Ninth,
bears this out insofar as they agreed with the majority that the amendment was not
called for by the states.  Despite this, they disagreed that it was dangerous: “Because
the 11th amendment, though not called for by any of the adopting States, we consider
as tending to quiet the minds of many, and in no possible instance productive of
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danger to the liberties of the people. . . .”125  Of course, we know that, in the end,
Randolph was convinced to support the Ninth Amendment, despite his reservations,
and Virginia ultimately ratified it.
The arguments made about the Ninth Amendment in the Virginia ratification
process strongly support the individual natural rights model and severely undercut
the collective rights model that would read the Ninth as completely equivalent to
Virginia’s seventeenth.   This change in meaning does not, however, preclude the
federalism model’s rule of construction.  Indeed, the Virginia senate considers the
possibility that the Ninth Amendment “is meant to guard against the extension of the
powers of Congress by implication.”  As we shall soon see, this is exactly how James
Madison uses the Ninth Amendment in his speech concerning the constitutionality
of the national bank.
Finally, by affirming the idea that the Ninth Amendment refers to “personal
rights” without any reference to state law rights, this evidence undercuts the state law
rights model.  It is also inconsistent with the residual rights model insofar as the
Virginia senate’s reading of the Ninth Amendment does not even hint at the idea that
the “personal rights” to which it refers are to be exclusively defined by the
enumerated powers included in the Constitution.
Before leaving the Virginia debates, it is useful to consider the objection of
the majority in the Virginia senate to the wording of the twelfth amendment—what
we know as the Tenth Amendment—for it sheds light on the meaning of “the people”
in the Ninth.  Here is what the majority reports:
We conceive that the 12th article would come up to the 1st article of the Virginia
amendments, were it not for the words “or to the people.”  It is not declared to be
the people of the respective States; but the expression applies to the people
generally as citizens of the United States, and leaves it doubtful what powers are
reserved to the State Legislatures.  Unrestrained by the constitution or these
amendments, Congress might, as the supreme rule of the people, assume those
powers which properly belong to the respective States, and thus gradually effect an
entire consolidation.126
This objection echoes that of Richard Henry Lee:
By comparing the Senate amendments with [those] from below by carefully
attending to the m[atter] the former will appear well calculated to enfeeble [and]
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produce ambiguity—for instance—Rights res[erved] to the States or the
People—The people here is evidently designed fo[r the] People of the United
States, not of the Individual States [page torn] the former is the Constitutional idea
of the people—We the People &c. . . . [T]his mode of expressing was evidently
calculated to give the Residuum to the people of the U. States, which was the
Constitutional language, and to deny it to the people of the Indiv. State—At least
that it left room for cavil & false construction—They would not insert after people
therof—altho it was moved.127
While it is far from dispositive, this objection to the Tenth Amendment
severely undercuts the state law rights model, as it indicates that the People to which
both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were read as referring to the people of the
United States, and not the people of each of the several states.  And this, in turn,
supports the conclusion that the rights and powers of the people, to which both
amendments refer, are the natural rights and powers of the people as individuals,
rather than particular rights they may have as citizens of their respective states.
On the other hand, it also must be remembered that these are all objections
made by and to other Antifederalist opponents of the new Constitution.  It was never
clear that these opponents really wanted an effective bill of rights, rather than using
its absence as a political weapon to defeat the new Constitution itself.  This
opposition comes through clearly both in the statements of those who are objecting
to the proposed amendments128 and in the reactions to these protests by supporters of
the Constitution and amendments.129
So we need consider these objections by Virginian Antifederalists, heartfelt
as they were, with some measure of skepticism.  Still, had these not seemed like
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reasonable interpretations of the public meaning of the text, citing them would not
have advanced the Antifederalist cause of undercutting the new Constitution by
undercutting the proposed amendments offered to bolster its perceived legitimacy.
Whatever is the appropriate discount to be applied to this evidence, it cuts in favor
of the individual natural rights and federalism models, and against the state-law
rights, residual rights, and collective rights models.
H.  Madison and Burnley’s Replies to Randolph’s Objections
Madison’s immediate reply to Randolph’s objection suggests that the
protection of retained rights and a rule of construction limiting the extensions of
federal power amounted in practice to the same thing.  In his letter to Washington,
Madison writes:
The difficulty started agst the amendments is really unlucky, and the more to be
regretted as it springs from a friend to the Constitution.  It is a still greater cause of
regret, if the distinction be, as it appears to me, altogether fanciful.  If a line can be
drawn between the powers granted and the rights retained, it would seem to be the
same thing, whether the latter be secured [“whether” stricken out] by declaring that
they shall not be abridged [“be violated” stricken out], or that the former not be
extended.  If no line can be drawn, a declaration in either form would amount to
nothing.130
This passage has been much debated by Ninth Amendment scholars.  While it is
inconsistent with a state-law rights model, Thomas McAffee has claimed that it
implies his residual rights model.131
Yet, the residual rights model insists that the Ninth Amendment tells us
nothing about how the powers of Congress are to be construed.  In contrast, Madison
insists that the protection of the rights retained by the people is a means by which
“the powers granted . . . not be extended.”  Remember that the provision in his
original proposal, which borrowed from the language proposed by Virginia and other
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states was that express exceptions to federal power, “not be so construed . . . as to
enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution.”132
One way to unpack Madison’s typically complex phraseology is by
distinguishing between means and ends.  In this letter, Madison explains that the
single end of the provision is that “the latter be secured” referring to the “rights
retained.”  He then identifies two means to this end that might have been included in
the text: an expressed declaration of “rights retained . . . that shall not be abridged”
or an expression that “powers granted . . . shall not be extended.”  As means to the
end that “the rights retained . . . be secured,” both of these textual formulations
amount to “the same thing.”  Which is not to say that either formulation is the same
as an explicit protection of the rights of states rights as was proposed by Virginia.
This difference between means and ends shows through more clearly from
Hardin Burnley’s response to Randolph’s objections.
But others among whom I am one see not the force of the distinction, for by
preventing an extension of power in that body from which danger is apprehended
safety will be insured if its powers are not too extensive already, & so by protecting
the rights of the people & of the States, an improper extension of power will be
prevented & safety made equally certain.133
As I have discussed elsewhere,134 even more clearly than Madison, Burnley is here
assessing two competing means to the end of protecting the rights of the people.
According to Burnley, “by protecting the rights of the people & of the States, an
improper extension of power will be prevented & safety made equally certain.”  That
is, Burnley advocates protecting rights as a means of preventing an improper
extension of power—exactly how Madison used the Ninth Amendment in his bank
speech, as we shall see.  The other method of ensuring safety is “by preventing an
extension of power.”  True, Burnley wrote of the “rights of the people & of the
States,” which might suggest that he thought the actual Ninth Amendment protected
both.  Yet, by this very language Burnley himself clearly distinguishes between “the
people” and “the states” and the actual words of the Ninth Amendment refers only
to the former. 
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Madison’s reply to Randolph’s concerns can be viewed as endorsing a
restrictive construction of federal power as a means to the end of protecting the
natural individual rights retained by the people.  It is, therefore, consistent with both
the federalism and natural individual rights models of the Ninth Amendment.
Madison’s letter offers no support whatsoever for the collective rights model.  For
while Madison equates the protection of the rights retained by the people with
construing the federal powers narrowly, (unlike Burnley) he does not even intimate
any protection of powers of states, or that the rights to be protected were collective
in nature.  The fact that Madison equates the Ninth Amendment with that aspect of
Virginia’s Seventeenth proposal that would narrowly construe federal power in no
waysupports an equivalent between the Ninth Amendment and that part of Virginia’s
proposal that would have protected the reserved rights of the states, rather than the
retained rights of the people.
I.  Madison’s Bank Speech
If Madison’s explanation of the purpose of the Ninth Amendment in his Bill
of Rights Speech is the most important evidence of its original meaning, then how
he actually used the Ninth Amendment in a constitutional argument in his speech to
the House opposing a national bank is a close second.  In this speech, Madison
contended that a national bank was unconstitutional because it was beyond the power
of Congress to establish.  Because he actually uses the Ninth Amendment in a
constitutional argument, this speech is very useful to understanding its role in
constitutional adjudication.  The implications of his usage are so obvious, that they
do not take long to explain.
Near the end of his speech in which he was arguing that the power to
incorporate a bank, and grant it a monopoly, were beyond those granted to Congress
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, he observed: “The latitude of interpretation
required by the bill is condemned by the rule furnished by the Constitution itself.”135
As one authority for this “rule” of interpretation, Madison cited the Ninth
Amendment:
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at least, would be
good authority with them; all these renunciations of power proceeded on a rule of
construction, excluding the latitude now contended for. . . .  He read several of the
articles proposed, remarking particularly on the 11th [the Ninth Amendment] and
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12th [the Tenth Amendment], the former, as guarding against a latitude of
interpretation; the latter, as excluding every source or power not within the
Constitution itself.136
Thus, Madison viewed the Ninth and Tenth amendments as playing the
distinct roles that Kurt Lash has rightly emphasized can be found in different
proposals by the states.  Madison viewed the Tenth Amendment as authority for the
rule that Congress could only exercise a delegated power.  For example, Congress
could not establish a post office or raise and support armies without a delegation of
power to pursue these ends.  In contrast, Madison viewed the Ninth Amendment as
providing authority for a rule against the loose construction of these powers—
especially the Necessary and Proper Clause—when legislation affected the rights
retained by the people.  As Madison concluded in his bank speech: “In fine, if the
power were in the Constitution, the immediate exercise of it cannot be essential; if
not there, the exercise of it involves the guilt of usurpation. . . .”137
Madison’s use of the Ninth Amendment in his bank speech substantiates the
inference raised by his bill of rights speech that the unenumerated individual rights
retained by the people provide the same sort of check on latitudinarian constructions
of federal power as do the enumerated individual rights.  This strongly confirms the
federalism model, in which the Ninth Amendment argues against a latitudinarian
construction of federal powers.  This is hardly surprising as this model largely grew
out of Madison’s usage in this speech.  
In contrast, Madison’s speech comprises a virtual refutation of the residual
rights model, as Madison is using the Ninth Amendment as means of construing the
power of Congress, which Thomas McAffee who advanced that model expressly
denied was a purpose of the Ninth Amendment.  In other words, Madison himself
used the Ninth Amendment in a manner that is completely outside the only function
that the residual rights model claims it has.  Nor is Madison’s usage consistent with
the state law rights model. Although the national bank was opposed, in part, as an
interference with the power of states to have their own banks, the state law rights
model concerns the rights of individuals as protected by state bills of rights or the
common law.  In making his Ninth Amendment argument, Madison referred to
neither sorts of individual state law rights.
Whether this speech supports the individual rights or collective rights models
is disputed.  Kurt Lash has strongly claimed that is supports the latter and not the
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former, but his presentation of the evidence is erroneous in two important respects.
First, Lash relies heavily upon a statement by Madison that, at first blush, looks like
it does indeed support Lash’s claim:
To those who argued that Congress could act for the “general welfare” so long as
it did not interfere with the powers of the States, Madison responded that chartering
a bank “would directly interfere with the rights of the States, to prohibit as well as
to establish banks.”  Here, Madison sounds a theme that would continue throughout
his speech: Chartering the bank would violate the rights of the states.138
But immediately after the quoted statement, Madison says this:
3.  Interference with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the
power of Congress.  If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if
given, they might exercise it, altho it should interfere with the laws, or even with the
constitution of the States.139
How are these two seemingly contradictory statements to be reconciled?
Easily, as it turns out.  As Lash notes, Madison is here responding to an argument by
supporters of the bank that the “general welfare” clause means that “a general power
might be exercised by Congress, without interfering with the powers of the States;
and that the establishment of a National Bank was of this sort.”140  In other words, the
only prohibition on Congressional lawmaking for the general welfare is when such
laws interfere with the powers of the states.141  Madison then replies to this purported
interpretation with four alternative counter-arguments including the second, that this
power does interfere with the powers of the states, and the third, that it does not
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matter whether it does or not if the power was really delegated to Congress, in which
case it would supercede state powers.142
Lash’s second error is to dismiss my contention that Madison’s constitutional
argument was based, in part, on the fact that the bank would violate individual rights,
in particular, when Madison argues that “[i]t involves a monopoly, which affects the
equal rights of every citizen.”143  Lash argues to the contrary that “[a]t no point did
Madison argue that chartering a bank violated an individual right.”144  Lash then
claims that “Madison’s argument about the unequal treatment of citizens went to his
understanding of the effects of the monopoly and were separate from his views
regarding the constitutionalityof the bank.”145  To support this reading, he reproduces
a veto statement that Madison had drafted for President Washington, which I too now
present in its entirety:
Feb. 21, 1791 
   Gentlemen of the Senate 
   Having carefully examined and maturely considered the Bill entitled “An Act[”]
I am compelled by the conviction of my judgment and the duty of my Station to
return the Bill to the House in which it originated with the following objections: 
    (if to the Constitutionality) 
   I object to the Bill because it is an essential principle of the Government that
powers not delegated by the Constitution cannot be rightfully exercised; because the
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power proposed by the Bill to be exercised is not expressly delegated; and because
I cannot satisfy myself that it results from any express power by fair and safe rules
of implication. 
    (if to the merits alone or in addition) 
I object to the Bill because it appears to be unequal between the public and the
Institution in favor of the institution; imposing no conditions on the latter equivalent
to the stipulations assumed by the former. [quer. if this lie within the intimation of
the President.]  I object to the Bill because it is in all cases the duty of the
Government to dispense its benefits to individuals with as impartial a hand as the
public interest will permit; and the Bill is in this respect unequal to individuals
holding different denominations of public Stock and willing to become
subscribers.146
From this, Lash suggests to readers that Madison’s reference to “equal rights” went
“to the merits alone” rather than “to the Constitutionality.”147
This is mistaken.  First, the veto statement does not mention the problem of
monopoly.  The specific inequalities to which it does refer did indeed appear in
Madison’s speech in his “general review of the advantages and disadvantages of
banks.”148  There, Madison is reported to have made the precise objection found in
the draft veto statement:
The plan was unequal to the public creditors—it gave an undue preference to the
holders of a particular denomination of the public debt, and to those at and within
reach of the seat of government.  If the subscriptions should be rapid, the distant
holders of paper would be excluded altogether.149
However, the very next sentence reads: “In making these remarks on the merits of the
bill, he had reserved to himself, he said, the right to deny the authority of Congress
to pass it.”150
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Madison’s reference to “a monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every
citizen” appears some five pages later amid the heart of his constitutional objections.
And in considering this to be a constitutional argument, Madison was not alone.
That same day, Representative James Jackson of Georgia “urged the
unconstitutionality of the plan—called it a monopoly—such as one as contravenes
the spirit of the constitution. . . .”151  Representative Hugh Williamson of North
Carolina (who supported the bill) “averted to the objections deduced from the
constitution, and explained that the clause respecting monopolies as referring
altogether to commercial monopolies.”152
In sum, the meaning of the sentence on which Lash principally relies for his
claim that it “was the collective rights of the people of the several states which were
threatened by the Bill”153 is distorted when considered apart from the full context.
And his claim that Madison was not adverting to an infringement of an individual
right when making his constitutional objections is also in error.  However, there is
another statement by Madison that comes closer to lending support for Lash’s claim
that he fails to discuss.  
In Madison’s discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, he makes the
following argument:
The States have, it is allowed on all hands, a concurrent right to lay and collect
taxes.  This power is secured to them not by its being expressly reserved, but by its
not being ceded by the constitution.  The reason for the bill cannot be admitted,
because they would invalidate that right.154
And Madison also argues that the overbroad interpretation of the General Welfare
clause “would give to Congress an unlimited power; would render nugatory the
enumeration of particular powers; would supercede all the powers reserved to the
state governments.”155  There is nothing exceptionable about these arguments, but to
see why we need to take a step back from the minutia of particular statements.
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Madison is arguing here against a latitudinarian interpretation of various
enumerated powers. There is no question but that an overly broad interpretation of
enumerated powers can interfere with both the reserved political powers of the states,
as well as violate the individual rights retained by the people.  In his speech, he offers
pages of different types of authority for his claim that “The latitude of interpretation
required by the bill is condemned by the rule furnished by the constitution itself.”156
His reference to the Ninth Amendment comes two pages later after the introductory
statement (quoted above) that:  “The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress
themselves, at least, would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of
power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now contended
for.”157  The fact that a particular claim of implied power might trench upon the
powers of states referenced by the Tenth Amendment was a consideration arguing
against such a claim.  That the Ninth Amendment referred only to individual rights,
would not entail that a latitude of construction was therefore warranted when the
powers of states were being restricted.
In other words, Madison’s use of an argument based on state powers in this
speech does not directly tell us that the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment
included states rights.  Rather, Madison’s specific use of the Ninth Amendment tells
us only that it argues against “a latitude of interpretation” with respect to enumerated
powers.  On this important point, Kurt Lash and I agree.  Madison’s other statements
elsewhere in his speech that refer to restrictions on state powers may not connect at
all to the Ninth Amendment, but simply be a part of his general collections of
arguments against this use of implied powers to justify the Bank.
Here is another way to understand this point.  The other evidence we have
examined to this point show that the Ninth Amendment was intended to handle a
particular problem created by a bill of rights: to ensure that, when particular natural
rights of the people were specified (which were all individual personal rights), other
natural rights of the people should not be construed to have been surrendered up to
the general government and consequently insecure.  That the Ninth Amendment is
a textual argument against such an improper construction of federal power does not
preclude the different claim that it is also improper to invoke an implied federal
power that would interfere with a reserved power of the states.
For the amendment to read as proponents of the collective rights model would
have it, the rest of the Bill of Rights would have to have primarily concerned
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protecting the powers of states.  It would have to mean, in effect, “The enumeration
in the Constitution of certain powers/rights of states shall not be construed to deny
or disparage other powers/rights of states.”  But claims by those who would read the
Second Amendment otherwise notwithstanding,158 the other amendments were not
about states rights.  We can be certain, therefore, that this was not the meaning of the
Ninth Amendment because this was not the problem for which the Ninth Amendment
was devised by Madison to be the solution.  While Akhil Amar puts forth a collective
rights reading of the Bill of Right as a whole, this interpretation is at odds with the
evidence presented here and elsewhere.159  Kurt Lash does not make such a claim,
and even Amar does not claim that the Bill of Rights was exclusively collective.
Finally, we cannot make too much of Madison’s two uses of the word
“rights” when referring to the powers of states.160  The Constitution is far more
scrupulous about using the terms “rights” only when speaking of the people or
citizens or persons, and “powers” when speaking of either the government or the
people.   In every day discourse, speakers were not so punctilious.   Overwhelmingly,
however, in his speech Madison refers to the powers of states, rather than to their
rights.161
Despite the fact that the Constitution speaks only of governmental powers and
not rights, however, there is nothing inaccurate about referring to the “rights of
states” within the federal system established by the Constitution.  But this does not
mean that the “rights . . . retained by the people” is a reference to these rights that
may be either explicit or implicit in a federal scheme of delegated powers.  But even
if it was, as was noted in the Introduction, this is not logically inconsistent with a
reading of the Ninth Amendment as protecting both individual and states rights from
a latitudinarian interpretation of the enumerated powers.  Were states’ rights included
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in the meaning along with individual rights, it would simply broaden the scope of the
Ninth Amendment to include situations where no individual liberty rights were at
issue.  
So the only claim that contradicts the individual natural rights model would
be that the collective rights model is the exclusive interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment.  By now I trust that readers can see how nonexistent is the evidence
that supports such a claim of exclusivity and how powerful is the evidence against
it.   While Kurt Lash denies this is his position,162 there are places in his article, such
as those discussed in this section, that give readers this misimpression.163  To the
extent that Kurt Lash’s use of Madison’s Bank Speech is meant to suggest that
Madison had only collective and not individual rights in mind when he invoked the
Ninth Amendment, I have explained here why the evidence he cites is mistakenly
interpreted.
J.  Madison’s Whiskey Rebellion Speech
Generally overlooked is another reference by Madison apparently to
individual rights retained by the people when construing the powers of Congress,
though the significance of this reference is fuzzier than the others.  Three years after
his Bank Speech, in 1794, Madison would again argue in Congress that the
unenumerated rights retained by the people directly constrained Congressional
power.  When Congress sought to censure the activities of certain self-created
societies for their participation in the Whiskey Rebellion earlier that year, Madison
contended that: “When the people have formed a Constitution, they retain those
rights which they have not expressly delegated.”164  Here Madison was asserting that
the unenumerated retained right to hold opinions constrained the power of Congress
to issue a censure, in the same manner as “the liberty of speech, and of the press.”165
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Indeed, “the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the
Government over the people.”166
By directly referring to an unenumerated individual right as constraining the
powers of Congress, Madison’s usage here strongly supports the individual natural
right and federalism models, but is inconsistent with the state-law rights.  Although
referring to the enumerated powers, this statement is inconsistent with the residual
rights model’s claim that the residual rights of the people are defined by the
enumerated powers.  To the contrary, Madison is referring to an unenumerated right
of the people to censure their government as an argument against the exercise of
federal power.
It also undercuts any claim that the “rights . . . retained by the people” were
exclusively “collective” and that to speak of them as individual is to engage in
anachronism.  The rights to which Madison referred were held by individuals who
organized themselves into private associations or “societies.”  These associations of
“insurgents” could hardly be equated with the “collective rights” of the people as a
whole, unless the concept of “collective right” is stretched to the breaking point.167
On the other hand, this statement by Madison is not crystal clear.  Most
importantly, Madison does not explicitly refer to the Ninth Amendment.  Just as
“retained those rights” evokes the Ninth Amendment, Madison’s reference to “which
they have not expressly delegated” seems to evoke the Tenth Amendment.  But if he
had the Tenth Amendment in mind, it is that portion of the Tenth that refers to the
reserved powers of the people, not the states.  If so, these powers too are individual
and not collective.  Moreover, these reserved powers are closely connected to the
retained rights.  Madison more clearly invokes the reserved powers of the people in
the context of the Tenth Amendment in his famed Report on the Virginia Resolutions
to which we now turn.
K.  Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions
In 1798, Congress enacted the Aliens and Sedition Acts empowering the
President to deport aliens deemed dangerous—though these aliens were not from an
enemy nation—and making it a federal crime to disparage the federal government
and its officials.  That same year, James Madison drafted the Virginia Resolutions
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declaring the Acts to be unconstitutional.  In 1800, his lengthy Report on the Alien
and Sedition Acts in defense of the Virginia Resolutions was approved by the
Virginia assembly.168  Madison’s report received wide attention.  As late as 1819, it
was described as “the Magna Charta” of the Republicans “after the great struggle in
the year 1799.”169
Because it does not discuss the Ninth Amendment—and perhaps also because
it comes nine years after the Bill of Rights was adopted—Madison's Report has not
often been the subject of Ninth Amendment scholarship.170  But as Kurt Lash now
contends that the Ninth Amendment, and not the Tenth, was meant to protect the
rights of states against a latitude of construction of federal powers, Madison's Report
becomes relevant.  For, in contesting the constitutionality of the Aliens and Sedition
Acts, Madison relies on both the First and Tenth Amendments, but does not rely on
the Ninth.  Therefore, if Madison is arguing against a latitude of interpretation of
enumerated federal powers because it interferes with the reserved rights and powers
of the states, then this is powerful evidence that the Tenth Amendment, and not the
Ninth, is the source of a “federalism” rule of construction protecting the rights and
powers of the states, as well as the powers of the people.  Since we know from his
Bank Speech that Madison also viewed the Ninth Amendment as arguing against a
latitude of construction, its “federalism” rule of construction would protect the
individual natural rights retained by the people, rather than the reserved (rights and)
powers of states protected by the Tenth.
To his credit, Madison’s Report is discussed by Kurt Lash.  His reason for
dismissing its relevance is short:
Congress based its authority to pass the Acts on its inherent unenumerated power
to enforce the common law.  According to the Virginia Resolutions, the Acts
“exercise[] in like manner, a power not delegated by the constitution, but on the
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173Id.  To this claim, Madison replied, “that the removal of alien enemies is an incident to the
power of war; that the removal of alien friends, is not an incident to the power of war.” Id. at 626-27.
174Id. at 627.
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contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto.”
This case did not involve the construction of enumerated power.  It involved a
power derived from unenumerated common law and stood in clear violation of the
positive denial of power contained in the First Amendment. . . .  Given the common
law basis of arguments supporting the Alien and Sedition Acts, if ever there was a
Tenth Amendment issue, this was it.171
This dismissal implies that, if the case did involve “the construction of enumerated
power” then, on Lash’s theory, Madison should have invoked the Ninth.  Conversely,
if the case involved the construction of an enumerated power, the fact that Madison
invoked the Tenth instead would be significant evidence against Lash’s theory.  In
essence, it would pit Madison against Lash. 
As it happens, although Madison’s Report did focus on the claim that the
Sedition Act was authorized by a federal common law, various latitudinarian
constructions of enumerated powers were offered on behalf of the Aliens Act.  In
particular, Madison discusses claims based on the enumerated powers to “grant
letters of marque and reprisal,”172 the “power of war,”173 and the power “to protect
each state against invasions.174  As to the claim that Congress has the power over all
means that may tend to prevent an invasion, Madison replied: “Such a latitude of
construction would render unavailing, every practicable definition of particular and
limited powers.”175  With respect to the Sedition Act, Madison also addressed the
claim that the federal codification of the common law was justified by the
enumerated Judicial Power of Article III, sec. 2.  To this he responded, “[n]ever
perhaps was so broad a construction applied to a text so clearly unsusceptible of
it.”176  Later he observes:  
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It is indeed distressing to reflect, that it ever should have been made a question,
whether the Constitution, on the whole face of which is seen so much labour to
enumerate and define the several objects of federal power, could intend to introduce
in the lump, in an indirect manner, and by a forced construction of a few phrases,
the vast and multifarious jurisdiction involved in the common law; a law filling so
many ample volumes; a law overspreading the entire field of legislation; and a law
that would sap the foundation of the Constitution as a system of limited and
specified powers.177
Therefore, it is simply inaccurate to claim that “the case did not involve the
construction of enumerated powers.”178  In each of these instances, Madison discusses
an overbroad construction of an enumerated power that impairs the rights and powers
of states.  That Madison does not mention the Ninth Amendment is affirmative
evidence that he did not think the Ninth Amendment applied to this situation.  The
only fair reading of this fifty page report is that it is grounded on the First and Tenth
Amendments, and not at all on the Ninth.
References to the principle articulated in the Tenth Amendment pervade the
opinion.179  Moreover, Madison refers to “the authorities, rights, and liberties,
reserved to the States respectively, or to the People,"180 and “the rights reserved to the
States, or to the people.”181  While Lash contends that the “rights” of states must be
included in the Ninth Amendment’s reference to “rights . . . retained by the people”
whenever federal powers are being construed, Madison clearly considers these rights
of states to be embraced by the Tenth. 
We have already seen how Madison’s Bank Speech demolishes the residual
rights model.182  In that speech, Madison uses the Ninth Amendment outside the only
context in which, according to that model, it was applicable.  Similarly Madison’s
failure to cite the Ninth Amendment when these latitudinarian constructions of
particular federal powers jeopardize the “rights” and powers of states undercuts both
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the collective rights model of the Ninth Amendment and explodes the claim that the
federalism model applies exclusively to the Ninth and not also to the Tenth
Amendment. 
To this point, I have confined myself to examples of enumerated powers
because of Lash’s claim that it is only in such a case that a rule of construction
protecting the rights and powers of states based on the Ninth Amendment would have
been invoked.  But on his reading, why would the invocation of an implied power
that threatens the rights and powers of states not also be rejected under the
construction that he says is provided by a Ninth Amendment?  After all, according
to his theory, only the Ninth Amendment, and not the Tenth, provides a rule of
construction against a latitudinarian interpretation of federal powers.  Therefore, I see
no reason why any construction of federal power that violated the reserved “rights
and powers” of states, including a latitudinarian claim of implied power, should not
also be handled by the Ninth Amendment under Lash’s account instead of the Tenth.
Yet in his Report, Madison repeatedly rejects claims of implied powers as
overbroad without invoking the Ninth Amendment.  For example, he considers
whether the Necessary and Proper Clause could be used to justify the Sedition act and
offers the same argument concerning the meaning of “necessary” as he did in his
bank speech.  
[T]he first question is, whether the power be expressed in the constitution.  If it be,
the question is decided.  If it be not expressed; the next enquiry must be, whether
it is properly an incident to an express power, and necessary to its execution.  If it
be, it may be exercised by Congress.  If it be not; Congress cannot exercise it.183
As he did in his Bank Speech, Madison ties this rule of construction to assertions
made by Federalists in the ratification conventions, and then adds that “it is a
construction absolutely necessary to maintain their consistency with the peculiar
character of the government, as possessed of particular and defined powers only; not
of the general and indefinite powers vested in ordinary governments.”184
As he was to do later when criticizing John Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch
v. Maryland,185 Madison also justifies his construction of the Necessary and Proper
Clause on the ground that it is justiciable.
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If it be understood that the powers implied in the specified powers, have an
immediate and appropriate relation to them, as means, necessary and proper for
carrying them into execution, questions on the constitutionality of laws passed for
this purpose, will be of a nature sufficiently precise and determinate for Judicial
cognizance and controul [sic].  If, on the other hand, Congress are not limited in the
choice of means by any such appropriate relation of them to the specified powers;
but may employ all such means as they may deem fitted to prevent as well as to
punish crimes subjected to their authority; such as may have a tendency only to
promote an object for which they are authorized to provide; every one must
perceive that questions relating to means of this sort, must be questions of mere
policy and expediency; on which legislative discretion alone can decide, and from
which the judicial interposition and controul are completely excluded.186
Of course, the Sedition Act also violated individual natural rights retained
by the people: the rights of freedom of speech and press.  There was no need for
Madison to cite the Ninth Amendment in this context, however, because these rights
were enumerated in the First Amendment, as Madison takes pains to explain.  In
other words, because a latitude of construction is not being used here to infringe upon
an unenumerated right retained by the people, the Ninth Amendment would not
pertain.
Madison also connects the enumerated right protected by the First
Amendment with powers not delegated to the federal government: “If no such power
be expressly delegated, and it be not both necessary and proper to carry into
execution an express power; above all, if it be expressly forbidden by a declaratory
amendment to the constitution, the answer must be that the federal government is
destitute of all authority.”187  In other words, where Congress is expressly denied a
power, this power is reserved to the people, as affirmed by the Tenth Amendment.
As Madison explained in his earlier discussion of the Aliens Act, “there are powers
exercised by most other governments, which, in the United States are withheld by the
people, both from the general government and from the state governments.”188  This
reservation of powers in the people negates any “inference . . . that the powers
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supposed to be necessary that are not so given to the state governments, must reside
in the government of the United States.”189
How then can we reconcile Madison’s repeated use of the Tenth Amendment
in his Report also to argue against a “latitude of construction”190 with his statement
in his bank speech that the Ninth Amendment guards against a “latitude of
interpretation.”?191  The explanation cannot be, as Lash proposes, that the Ninth
Amendment provides a rule of construction and the Tenth Amendment does not.
After all, even a constitutional provision that does not include the phrase “shall not
be construed.” could potentially support a rule of construction, depending on its
meaning.
The obvious way to reconcile these two vital Madisonian clues, is to
distinguish between the differing source of the danger posed by any particular
latitude of interpretation.  The Ninth Amendment can be viewed as aimed at the
danger of latitudinarian constructions of federal power that threaten the (individual
natural) rights retained by the people.  The Tenth Amendment can be viewed as
aimed at the danger of latitudinarian constructions of federal power that threaten the
powers (and rights) reserved by the Constitution to the states, as well as the powers
reserved to the people.192 As it turns out, within three years of Madison’s Report, this
very interpretation of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments was offered by a
distinguished Virginia professor and jurist.
L.  St. George Tucker’s Notes on the Constitution
St. George Tucker was professor of law at the College of William and Mary,
one of the leading judges of the General Court in Virginia, and the American editor
of Blackstone’s Commentaries, the most influential and authoritative legal work of
the period.  In the 1803 edition of the Commentaries, he attached an appendix
entitled, Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government
of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in which he provides the
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first scholarly gloss on the meaning of the Constitution.  Though published after
1800, Tucker’s treatise was based on notes of his lectures given throughout the
1790’s and contemporaneous with the earliest years of the Constitution.
In his treatise on the Constitution, Tucker offered an interpretation of the
Ninth Amendment very similar to that provided by Madison in his bank speech, and
an interpretation of the Tenth Amendment very similar to that provided by Madison
in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions. Tucker begins his explanation of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments (still referred to as the “eleventh” and “twelfth”) by
discussing them together in the following passage: 
All the powers of the federal government being either expressly enumerated, or
necessary and proper to the execution of some enumerated power; and it being one
of the rules of construction which sound reason has adopted; that, as exception
strengthens the force of a law in cases not excepted, so enumeration weakens it, in
cases not enumerated; it follows, as a regular consequence, that [1] every power
which concerns the right of the citizen, must be construed strictly, where it may
operate to infringe or impair his liberty; and liberally, and for his benefit, where it
may operate to his security and happiness, the avowed object of the constitution:
and, in like manner, [2] every power which has been carved out of the states, who,
at the time of entering into the confederacy, were in full possession of all the rights
of sovereignty, is, in like manner to be construed strictly, wherever a different
construction might derogate from the rights and powers, which by the latter of these
articles; are expressly acknowledged to be reserved to them respectively. 193
I have inserted numbers in brackets to indicate the distinct treatment given the Ninth
and Tenth Amendment respectively.  
According to Tucker, the Ninth Amendment provides a rule of construction
when the “rights of the citizen”—which he refers also as “his liberty”—are at stake.
Notice his use of the singular tense (“his liberty” “his benefit” “his security”).  The
Tenth Amendment (“the latter of these two articles”), in contrast, argues for a strict
construction of federal powers when a “different construction” (as distinct from the
text of the Constitution itself) might derogate from the rights and powers of states.
Tucker shared with Madison the view that the Ninth Amendment provided an
argument against a latitudinarian interpretation of the delegated powers, but he also
made even clearer that its purpose is the protection of individual liberty, which
justifies both a “strict construction” of powers and “liberal construction” of rights.
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Earlier in his Notes, Tucker provides another description of the two
constructions that further emphasizes the personal nature of the liberties protected by
the Ninth Amendment.  “As federal it is to be construed strictly, in all cases where
the antecedent rights of a state may be drawn in question.”194  This sentence is
followed by a footnote citing the Tenth (twelfth) Amendment.  The passage then
continues:  
as a social compact it ought likewise to receive the same strict construction,
wherever the right of personal liberty, of personal security, or of private property
may become the subject of dispute; because every person whose liberty or property
was thereby rendered subject to the new government, was antecedently a member
of a civil society to whose regulations he had submitted himself, and under whose
authority and protection he still remains, in all cases not expressly submitted to the
new government.195
This passage is followed by a footnote reference to the Ninth (eleventh) and Tenth
(twelfth) Amendments.  Reading Tucker lays to rest any contention that an individual
rights reading of the Ninth Amendment is anachronistic. A “federal” system is the
source of the reserved powers (and rights) of states.  But the “social compact” is the
source of the retained natural rights (and powers) of individuals.
Notice that Tucker specifically notes that “the rights and powers” of the states
are expressly acknowledged in the Tenth Amendment (“the latter of these article”)
rather than the Ninth.  He then provides a lengthy paragraph about the rule of
construction he says is provided by the Tenth Amendment.  Of particular interest is
the observation, portions of which are copied nearly verbatim from Madison’s
Report, that the Tenth Amendment acknowledges that the people, as well as the
states, have reserved powers:  
[T]here are powers, exercised by most other governments, which in the United
States are withheld by the people, both from the federal government and from the
state governments: for instance, a tax on exports can be laid by no constitutional
authority whatever, whether of the United States, or of any state; no bill of attainder;
or ex post facto law can be passed by either; no title of nobility can be granted by
either.196
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Tucker then explains that the power of regulating liberty lies with the states, 
such as the power of regulating the course in which property may be transmitted by
deed, will, or inheritance; the manner in which debts may be recovered, or injuries
redressed; the right of defining and punishing offences against the society, other
than such as fall under the express jurisdiction of the federal government; all which,
and all others of a similar nature are reserved to, and may be exercised by the state
governments.197
It is important to remember, as was mentioned in Part III, that reading the
Ninth Amendment as protecting individual liberty rights no more precludes their
reasonable regulation, than does reading the First Amendment to protect an
individual right preclude “time, place and manner” regulations or the law of libel or
slander.  What is needed is a way to ensure that laws restricting liberties are genuine
regulations, providing for the manner of exercising one’s rights, or the prohibition
of wrongful acts.  What is improper is imposing restrictions that prohibit rightful
acts.198
But in making this point, one should not lose sight of the fact that originally
the Ninth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, was applicable only to the
Federal government.  To evaluate federal constitutional restrictions on infringements
of natural rights by state governments requires consideration of the Fourteenth
Amendment—especially the Privileges or Immunities Clause—that substantially
altered the constitutional structure.
The two rules of construction provided by Tucker’s distinction between the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments are devastating both to Amar’s claim that reading the
Ninth Amendment as protecting individual rights is anachronistic, and Lash’s claim
that only the Ninth and not the Tenth Amendment provides a rule of construction
narrowing federal power.  Indeed, in the beginning of his Notes, Tucker states the
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proposition (that originated in the Articles of Confederation199), so emphasized by
Lash,200 that: “The state governments not only retain every power, jurisdiction, and
right not delegated to the United States, by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
states.”201  This is followed by a footnote citation to the Tenth (twelfth) Amendment,
not the Ninth (eleventh).  Tucker then says that the construction “that in the new
government, as in the old, the general powers are limited, and that the states, in all
unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent
jurisdictions . . . has since been fully confirmed by the twelfth article of
amendments.”202
Kurt Lash’s discussion of Tucker’s apparently telling “personal rights” gloss
on the Ninth Amendment is brief and confined to a footnote.  “As the above shows,
Tucker placed both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in a decidedly federalist
context.  Tucker could not possibly have been referring to individual natural rights
if the Ninth was meant to avoid interfering with or adding to an individual’s prior
obligations to the state.”203
The first of these sentences is nonproblematic.  Tucker contended that both
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments supported “federalism” rules of construction
limiting federal power.  The second claim that Tucker “could not possibly have been
referring to individual natural rights” is hyperbole.  Not only the natural rights
reading a “possible” meaning of Tucker’s words, it is the most obvious and natural
one.  One would have to present a pretty persuasive case to deprive “the right of
personal liberty, of personal security, or of private property” of its then-commonplace
individual natural rights meaning.
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Lash’s bases his claim on Tucker’s statement (quoted above) that “because
every person whose liberty or property was thereby rendered subject to the new
government, was antecedently a member of a civil society to whose regulations he
had submitted himself, and under whose authority and protection he still remains, in
all cases not expressly submitted to the new government.”204  To begin with, this
statement is Tucker’s justification for the “strict construction” of federal power when
“personal” rights are “the subject of dispute.”  The purported justification does not
in any way change the personal nature of the rights being protected.  Tucker is simply
saying why the potential infringement of personal rights justifies strict construction
of federal powers.  But we are looking to Tucker’s Notes to discern the original
public meaning of the Ninth Amendment, not his justification for that provision, and
his description of the Amendment strongly supports the individual natural rights
model.
Second, Tucker’s justification is not in conflict with the rights protected by
the Ninth Amendment being individual natural rights.  Tucker is merely saying that
the fundamental natural rights of individuals were, before the Constitution, subject
to the protection and regulation of state governments.  For the jurisdiction over these
rights to be transferred to the new national government would have required an
express delegation of power, which was lacking.  This amounts merely to the
uncontroversial claim that the Constitution did not grant the federal government a
general police power.  In other words, these natural rights may not be regulated by
the federal government unless such regulation is incident to an enumerated federal
power.
In sum, in the absence of a delegation of powers, the federal government
lacks the power to deny or disparage the other natural liberty rights retained by the
people.  The power to protect and regulate individual rights remains with the states
to whom citizens did and still do owe a duty of obedience in return for the protection
of their rights.  But a police power to protect and regulate the exercise of individual
natural rights does not include the power to abridge or violate them.  Nevertheless,
with some exceptions—for example the Contracts Clause—there was no federal
jurisdiction to protect the rights retained by the people from infringement by state
governments until the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The only reason given by Lash for depriving Tucker’s words of their most
obvious and natural meaning, then, falls far short—especially in light of the myriad
other evidence supporting the individual natural rights model we have surveyed in
this article.  If all the other evidence lined up in favor of a collective rights reading
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of the Ninth Amendment, perhaps there would be some warrant for rejecting the
natural reading of Tucker’s words, or to reject Tucker himself as an aberration.  But
the other evidence that lines up in support of the individual rights and federalism
models is completely consistent with Tucker’s words, which in turn adds weight to
those models.  After all, Tucker simply asserts that the Ninth Amendment provides
a narrowing rule of construction of federal power to protect the rights of individuals
(which rights should be liberally construed), while the Tenth Amendment protects
the reserved powers of both states and individuals (and justifies a narrowing rule of
construction of federal power to accomplish this).  But is not this exactly what the
two amendments appear to say?
Finally, Lash completely overlooks the other respect in which his thesis is
directlycontradicted by Tucker’s Notes.  Lash claims that the Ninth Amendment, and
not the Tenth, provides a narrowing construction of federal power.  This is why he
interprets any argument made by Madison or others concerning the reserved or
retained rights and powers of states as references to the Ninth Amendment and
supportive of the collective rights model of the Ninth.  But Tucker clearly and
explicitly says that both amendments justify the strict construction of federal power,
albeit in response to different dangers.  And Tucker’s reading of the Tenth
Amendment relies upon and is wholly consistent with Madison’s lengthy analysis in
his Report.  If Tucker (and Madison) are correct that the Tenth Amendment also
supports a narrowing construction of federal powers, then much of Lash’s attempt to
link various references to the rights, powers and jurisdiction of states to the Ninth
Amendment is severely undercut.
St. George Tucker’s treatment of the Ninth Amendment sharply contradicts
both the state-law rights and residual rights models.  Nowhere in his account is the
protection of state-law rights mentioned as the object of the Amendment (though
state law can be used to regulate these rights, as we have seen).  And Tucker in no
way says or implies that the rights retained by the people are to be defined
“residually” by the enumerated powers of Congress.  To the contrary, he asserts that
the Ninth Amendment provides a rule of construction by which powers should be
strictly construed, and rights liberally construed—exactly what Thomas McAffee
denies is the purpose of the Ninth Amendment under the residual rights model.205
Tucker’s endorsement of the strict construction of federal powers strongly
supports the federalism model, though his “liberal construction” of individual liberty
rights goes beyond it.  And it is hard to think of more telling direct evidence on
behalf of the individual natural rights model than Tucker’s discussion of personal
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rights.  Tucker’s explicit distinction between the Ninth Amendment protecting
personal rights and the Tenth Amendment protecting the reserved rights of states is
nothing short of devastating to the collective rights model of the Ninth Amendment.
Anyone who could read “the right of personal liberty, of personal security, or of
private property” collectively could read anything collectively, rendering the
collective rights model nonfalsifiable.
M.  Adoption of Ninth Amendment-Like Provisions by States
After the Ninth Amendment was invented by James Madison as a means of
protecting unenumerated rights, the idea caught on.  Several states eventually adopted
similar provisions in their state constitutions.206  For example, in Section 21 of its
Declaration of Rights, the founding California constitution of 1849 read: “This
enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the
people.”207  This copy of the Ninth Amendment followed twenty enumerated rights
including Section 2, which enumerates the precise right that Akhil Amar identifies
as the core of the Ninth Amendment: 
All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded
on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and, therefore, they have, at all
times an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their form of
government, in such manner as they may think expedient.208
Whatever “other” rights “retained by the people” to which Section 21 refers do not
include the right to alter and abolish government that was enumerated in Section 2.
The implications of this development for the five models is reasonably
obvious. It flatly contradicts the claim that the Ninth Amendment is a reference to
state constitutional and common law rights, at least in the sense that the such rights
may freely be altered by state legislation.  Nor is it compatible with the residual rights
analysis, as most state constitutions did not contain specific enumeration of state
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legislative powers.  It does seem strongly to suggest an individual natural rights
reading.  After all, such rights were thought to constrain all persons, including
persons who serve as state officials.  
Although a Ninth Amendment-like provision in a state constitution could
include protection of rights to alter or abolish state governments or of collective self-
governance, there is no reason to think that this was its exclusive reference, and the
California constitution of 1849 is evidence that the rights retained by the people
include other rights besides.  While the existence of such provisions in state
constitutions is neutral with respect to the federalism model, such provisions may
well have meant that state powers should be strictly construed, as Madison and
Tucker urged with respect to federal powers. 
V. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The evidence presented in this article is offered solely to establish the original
meaning of the text of the Ninth Amendment.  It addresses the question: To what
does “rights . . . retained by the people” originally refer?  This evidence is not offered
as direct proof that such rights, whatever they may be, merit judicial protection.  The
question of judicial review in general, or with respect to unenumerated rights in
particular, implicates other arguments and additional evidence.209  This question is
beyond the scope of this article.         
Still, the evidence favoring the individual rights model of original meaning
interpretation and the federalism model of constitutional construction would seem
to have real practical implications for constitutional interpretation, whoever is doing
the interpreting.  If the federalism construction is accepted, both expressed and
implied federal powers should be “strictly” or narrowly construed—whether by
legislators or by courts—whenever they restrict the exercise of personal liberty,
which is another term for natural rights. For this reason, the judicial protection of
liberty described in footnote four of U.S. v. Carolene Products that reverses the
presumption of constitutionality only when enumerated rights are infringed is
unconstitutional; as is the “Footnote Four-Plus” approach that similarly privileges
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certain unenumerated rights that are deemed by the Court to be “fundamental.”210
Indeed, it seems that Footnote Four is the very paradigm construction of the
Constitution that was expressly ruled out by the original meaning of the Ninth
Amendment.
In contrast, were either the state-law rights or residual rights models correct,
the Ninth Amendment would have no role to play whatsoever in constitutional
adjudication—hence the appeal of these models to some judicial conservatives.
Were the amendment limited to a collective rights reading, then a strict construction
of federal powers would be warranted only when the exercise of those powers
interfere with the powers of the several states, and not when laws restricted personal
liberty.  Kurt Lash agrees that the Ninth Amendment has a broader scope than this.
Nevertheless, this debate over original meaning and its potential implication
for judicial review should be placed in perspective.  One source of fears about
allowing courts to take the Ninth Amendment seriously is the assumption that, if
natural liberty rights are acknowledged to be constitutionally protected, they may
never be regulated under any circumstances.  Since a great many laws touch upon
liberty in some manner or other, it is assumed that we must therefore limit any
constitutional protection to a handful of truly “fundamental” rights meriting so
absolute a protection.  Otherwise all laws would be constitutionally suspect.  But the
individual natural rights and federalism models, if accepted, do not preclude all
necessary and proper regulations of liberty.  Nor can these models automatically tell
us whether a particular exercise of federal power is truly necessary and proper.  This
would depend on the specifics of the statute in question and its purported
justification.
The individual natural rights model does not, however, posit that the
unenumerated rights retained by the people are any more absolute, in the sense that
their exercise may never be regulated, than are the enumerated rights retained by the
people.  Even enumerated rights may be regulated, though not prohibited, provided
such regulations are proper insofar as they are incident to an enumerated power and
truly necessary.211  An individual natural rights interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment would entail simply that the rights retained by the people may be
regulated by the federal government pursuant to an enumerated power, such as the
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power to regulate commerce among the several states.  The regulation of natural
rights for other purposes may only be done by states, but regulated they may be.212
It is improper, however, to completely prohibit the rightful exercise of a natural right,
but this too is beyond the scope of this article.213
To appreciate the implication of accepting the natural rights model, it bears
emphasis that, under this model, the Ninth Amendment provides no restriction on
state power, notwithstanding the belief of the founders that state governments were
also bound to respect natural rights. In this regard, the original scheme was
substantially altered by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  There is
substantial evidence that the original meaning of “privileges or immunities of
citizens” does include natural rights, as well as the positive individual rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.214  This too, like most other issues discussed in this
section are beyond the scope of this article.
Quite obviously, then, there is much more to be said about the proper role of
judges in protecting unenumerated rights against either federal power under the Ninth
Amendment or state power under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  But the fact that Ninth Amendment provides the only
explicit rule of construction in the text of the Constitution (“shall not be construed”)
strongly suggests that unenumerated rights deserve no less protection from courts
than those that were enumerated.  To do any less would be to “disparage,” if not to
“deny” them, in violation of the Ninth Amendment.
CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM NOT CONFEDERALISM
When evaluating historical evidence to decide among conflicting models of
original meaning, it is sometimes possible for individual items to be consistent with
more than one model.  Other evidence may make a model more or less likely without
establishing it definitively as accurate or inaccurate.  A choice among originalist
models, therefore, should be based on the cumulative weight of the evidence.  The
more items that support a particular model, the more likely that model is to be
correct, especially when little or no evidence is inconsistent with it.
As illustrated by the chart in the appendix, the evidence considered in this
article, taken cumulatively, strongly supports the individual natural rights model of
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the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment, as well as the federalism model that
protects these rights by construing federal power strictly.  Many items of evidence
support one or both of these models and none directly contradict either.  At the same
time, this evidence refutes the state-law rights and residual rights models and, taken
cumulatively, severelyundercuts the collective rights model of the Ninth (as opposed
to the Tenth) Amendment. 
Those who, like Akhil Amar and Kurt Lash, seek to interpret the Ninth
Amendment as protecting, at least in part or perhaps even entirely, the collective
rights of “the people” as embodied in their state governments,215 rather than of
individuals, are adopting a view of the amendment that does not appear to have been
shared by its author or by its principal proponents.  Yet this collective rights reading
of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments view did come to be widely held sometime later
in our history.216  Eventually, it was formally adopted by the Confederate States of
America in the following provisions:
5.  The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people of the several States.
6. The powers not delegated to the Confederate States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the
people thereof.217
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The collective rights model of the Ninth Amendment literally reads the italicized
language into both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  But the fact that the
Confederate States thought it necessary to add this language to the original language
of the Ninth Amendment is significant.  It strongly suggests that adding this extra
language to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as actually enacted would be to
deviate from, rather than to respect, their original public meaning.
When Robert Bork compared the Ninth Amendment to an inkblot, he violated
John Marshall’s famous dictum that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the
constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is
inadmissible unless the words require it.” 218  Still Bork was on to something for,
until quite recently, the Ninth Amendment has been the Rorschach test of
constitutional theory.  When asked, “What does the Ninth Amendment mean?,” the
Ninth has frequently elicited interpretations that tell us more about the constitutional
visions of the interpreters than about the words of the amendment.  But the Ninth
Amendment is not an inkblot; it consists of English words that are simple and direct:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
The historical evidence presented here supports an unremarkable, almost
mundane, conclusion:  The Ninth Amendment’s public meaning in the founding era
is identical to what ordinary readers take it to mean today (until they enter law school
and are told otherwise).  No elaborate theory or hidden code is required to decipher
its words.  The Ninth Amendment prohibits constitutional constructions—like that
propounded by the Supreme Court in  Footnote Four of Carolene Products219—that
infringe upon the unenumerated, natural, and individual rights retained by the people.
It means what it says.
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221Taken alone, Madison’s speech is neutral with respect to all models except the state-law
rights model which it directly contradicts.  But when combined with the Federalist objections to a bill
of rights, to which it refers, and Madison’s notes for his speech, it provides indirect support for the
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222Madison’s Bill of Rights speech, Federalist objections to a bill of rights, the Sedgwick-
Benson-Page exchange, Madison’s notes for his speech, and Sherman’s draft bill of rights weaken the
collective rights model because collective rights are not mentioned in these contexts and natural rights
are, which is circumstantial evidence that collective rights were not included.  These items only
somewhat weaken its support, however, because they do not directly prove that individual natural
rights were the only rights which were retained by the people.  On the other hand, these items are not
consistent with the suggestion that collective rights were the only rights to which the Ninth
Amendment refers.  They also contradict the claim that reading the Ninth Amendment as including
a reference to individual rights is anachronistic.
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223By directly contradicting the state-law rights and residual rights models, Madison’s Bank
speech increases the likelihood that either the individual natural rights model or the collective rights
model or both are correct, while offering little to favor one over the other.  While offering strong
support for the federalism model, Madison does not clearly specify the nature of the rights that warrant
the strict construction of federal power he finds in the Ninth Amendment.
224Madison’s Report, by itself, is neutral with respect to the individual natural rights model,
but by contradicting the state-law rights and residual rights models and indirectly weakening the
collective rights model, it makes the individual natural rights model somewhat more likely.
225Madison’s Report indirectly weakens the collective rights model by supporting the thesis
that the Tenth Amendment provides its own federalism rule of strict construction when state powers
and rights are abridged, thereby undercutting the claim that other statements in support of such a rule
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